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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the market effect of informed agents’ advice to buy-
ers and sellers. I compare two kinds of informed agents: one who maximizes an
expected sales price, the price-maximizing agent, and one who maximizes the proba-
bility of trade, the trade-maximizing agent.
The first chapter presents a theoretical model and results. The model is based
on a bilateral bargaining game with an informed agent, where the agent has more
information than either the buyer or the seller. I show that if there exists a bargaining
equilibrium in which a price-maximizing agent disseminates information truthfully,
then there also exists a bargaining equilibrium in which a trade-maximizing agent
disseminates information truthfully. However, the converse is not true. Thus, for
some cases, a trade-maximizing agent is truthful, but a price-maximizing agent is
not. In such cases, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher trade probability and
a higher expected sales price than a price-maximizing agent.
The second chapter studies the model under specific assumptions. Here, both the
buyer’s and seller’s good valuations are uniformly distributed, and the agent knows
whether each of the buyer and seller has a high or low valuation. I analyze three cases:
v
an informed agent advises (1) a buyer only, (2) a seller only, and (3) both. Whereas
a trade-maximizing agent is always truthful, a price-maximizing agent over-reports a
seller’s valuation to increase the sales price.
The third chapter empirically tests the model prediction: a trade-maximizing
agent leads to a higher trade probability than a price-maximizing agent. I do so
using South Korean housing transaction data. I exploit the unique Korean real estate
agents’ commission scheme to identify the two kinds of agents. I solve the missing
listing data problem by applying cluster analysis, which is an unsupervised machine
learning algorithm. I show the conditions under which the number of sales is the
appropriate proxy for the trade probability even when listing data are missing. The
results show that a trade-maximizing agent brings an approximately 0.2% greater
number of sales in each ten-day period relative to a price-maximizing agent.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Bargaining and an Informed Agent
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation studies informed intermediary’s advice to buyers and sellers and
the effect of that advice on a market where buyers and sellers trade goods under
incomplete information.
When a buyer and seller bargain under incomplete information, the buyer aggres-
sively bids a lower price, and the seller aggressively asks a higher price than their
respective true valuations of the good. In other words, when not aware of the ad-
versary’s valuation, a buyer understates and a seller overstates in order to maximize
each one’s expected payoff. As a result, sometimes a trade is not closed even when
the buyer’s true valuation is higher than the seller’s: it is ex-post inefficient. The
above aspects are well-summarized in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).
If there exists someone who can reduce the information incompleteness between
buyer and seller by advising them, then this person can reduce the ex-post inefficiency.
In other words, if someone has more accurate information than either party regarding
the adversary’s valuation, and reveals that information, then this person can make
the trade more likely to occur.
An intermediary is a person who acts as a link between buyers and sellers. That is,
an intermediary centralizes markets: either buying from sellers and then reselling to
buyers, or matching buyers and sellers together. Through these activities, the inter-
2mediary becomes more informed and experienced than his or her clients. Therefore,
the intermediary can advise buyers and sellers before they interact in the market so
that they are more likely to trade.
This advisory role is not significant in markets where an intermediary buys from
sellers and resells to buyers. In this situation, the intermediary merely offers a bid
price to sellers and an ask price to buyers rather than advising either of market
conditions. In such markets, there are two bargaining processes: one between seller
and intermediary and another between intermediary and buyer. As the intermediary
is a direct party in both bargaining processes, he or she does not advise either buyer
or seller.
However, in a market where an intermediary matches buyers and sellers together,
only one bargaining process occurs, between buyer and seller. As the intermediary
is not a direct party in this process, he or she can dispense advice to both buyer
and seller by way of cheap talk. For example, buyers and sellers in the real estate
market simply call or stop by a real estate agent’s office to obtain some information
concerning the market. The real estate agent can tell them whether it is currently a
buyer’s market or a seller’s market, even though the buyers and sellers pay nothing
to the agent in return for that information.
Although an intermediary gives some advice to buyers and sellers for free, this is
a strategic action: the intermediary is paid only if a mediated trade occurs. That
is to say, the compensation scheme for the intermediary affects his or her strategic
behavior not only in the stages of matching and closing deals but also in the advis-
ing stage. Many papers have focused on the matching and closing stages1; however,
almost none focus on the advising stage. This dissertation studies how the dissem-
ination of information by an intermediary during the advising stage is affected by
1See the list of the papers in Section 1.1.1
3different compensation schemes that reward the intermediary in return for matching
and closing deals.
In this chapter, I build a theoretical model to analyze an intermediary’s strategic
behavior during the advising stage. This model is based on the bilateral bargaining
game in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) into which I introduce an informed agent.
That is, there are three players in the model: a buyer, a seller, and an informed agent.
The seller owns an indivisible good that the buyer wants to obtain. The buyer has
an exact valuation in mind for the good but does not know the valuation held by
the seller. Similarly, the seller conceives of an exact valuation for the good but is not
aware of that held by the buyer. The informed agent receives finite signals about both
valuations and then delivers a private message to each participant. After receiving
the agent’s message, the buyer and seller submit their offers. If the buyer’s offer is
greater than or equal to that of the seller, they trade the good at a final price equal
to the average of their offers.
I compare two different kinds of informed agents: a price-maximizing agent and
a trade-maximizing agent. The utility of the price-maximizing agent is increasing in
the expected sales price, and that of the trade-maximizing agent is increasing in the
probability of trade.
The main result is as follows: If there exists an equilibrium in which the price-
maximizing agent truthfully disseminates information to both buyer and seller, then
there exists an equilibrium in which the trade-maximizing agent also truthfully dis-
seminates information to both parties. However, the converse of the above statement
is not true. That is, there exists a case where the trade-maximizing agent truthfully
disseminates information to the buyer and seller, but the price-maximizing agent does
not. In other words, the trade-maximizing agent makes more detailed information
available in the market, while the price-maximizing agent does not.
4As a result, the trade-maximizing agent reduces the information incompleteness
between buyer and seller and thus leads to a higher probability of trade and smaller
ex-post inefficiency. Moreover, the trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher expected
sales price than even the price-maximizing agent due to the higher probability of trade.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1.1, I briefly review
the related literature. In Section 1.2, I construct a theoretical model of a bargaining
game with an informed agent. Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 analyze the model, and I
conclude in Section 1.5. All the proofs of results in this chapter are in Appendix A.
1.1.1 Literature review
This chapter is concerned with bilateral trading and an intermediary liaising between
a buyer and a seller. In this section, I briefly highlight some of the existing literature
on these topics.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that for two parties trading a good when
they have private information regarding their valuations, there is no mechanism that
satisfies all of the ex-ante individual rationality, incentive compatibility, weak bal-
anced budget, and ex-post efficiency. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) add to this
with their study of an equilibrium in a bilateral bargaining game.2 They show that
relative to each party’s valuation, a buyer bids a lower price and a seller asks a higher
price because each seeks to maximize the expected payoff. As a result, the bargaining
rule in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) is also ex-post inefficient. However, the bar-
gaining rule gives the highest expected total gains from trade, as noted in Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983). Leininger et al. (1989) also characterize the other equilibria
of the bilateral bargaining game in their paper.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) introduce into a bilateral bargaining game a cheap
talk stage that occurs between buyer and seller before the bidding stage. When a
2Also known as a double auction.
5buyer and seller realize in the cheap talk stage that neither of them is keen to trade,
they never continue to the bidding stage even though there could still be a positive
probability of them making a trade. Thus, they reveal their types in the cheap talk
stage as in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Broadly, there are three types of intermediaries: a centralizer of a decentralized
market, a quality guarantor, and an advisor. The first type either centralizes the
market by buying from sellers and reselling to buyers or does so indirectly by matching
buyers and sellers with one another (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Biglaiser, 1993;
Gehrig, 1993; Yavas¸, 1994; Spulber, 1996a,b; Rust and Hall, 2003). The second type
is particularly relevant in situations where a seller has private information or a hidden
action of which the buyer is uninformed. In that case, the intermediary guarantees
quality either by buying only a high-quality good and reselling it to the buyer or by
certifying the good’s quality (Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994; Lizzeri, 1999; Biglaiser
and Li, 2018).
This chapter is more concerned with scenarios in which the intermediary acts as
an advisor; namely, the intermediary is informed while both buyer and seller are un-
informed. The informed intermediary advises the buyer and seller by delivering the
information that he or she has. In Suvorov and Tsybuleva (2010), uniform distribu-
tions are assumed for the buyer’s and seller’s respective valuations. They also assume
the information structure of the intermediary to be the partition of the support of the
valuation distribution. The partition structure has two subintervals over the support.
They characterize the partition structure where the intermediary, who receives a fixed
per-transaction fee, discloses information truthfully. I assume the distributions of the
buyer’s and seller’s valuations and the information structure of the intermediary in
a more general way. Moreover, I focus on the effects of different incentives for the
intermediary.
61.2 Basic setting
There are three players: a buyer, a seller, and an informed agent. I assume that the
seller owns an indivisible good that the buyer wants to obtain. The valuations of the
buyer and the seller are denoted by vb and vs, respectively. The buyer and seller are
risk neutral, and each has an additively separable utility for the good and money. If
they trade the good at a price of p, the buyer’s utility is vb−p, and the seller’s utility
is p− vs. Their utilities are normalized to 0 if no trade occurs.
Moreover, I assume that vb and vs are independent random variables distributed
over a non-negative interval of [v, v] with cumulative distribution functions of F b(·)
and F s(·), respectively3. That is, F b(v) = F s(v) = 0 and F b(v) = F s(v) = 1.
Furthermore, both F b(·) and F s(·) are strictly increasing and twice differentiable on
[v, v]. The corresponding density functions of F b(·) and F s(·) are denoted as f b(·)
and f s(·), respectively. Finally, I assume reflection-symmetric valuations of the buyer
and seller as below.
Assumption 1 F s(v) = 1− F b(v − v) for all v ∈ [v, v].
Figure 1·1: Reflection-symmetric valuations of buyer and seller
3We can also interpret this model as there are continua of buyers and sellers over [v, v] with F b(·)
and F s(·), respectively.
7Note that given a specific price, the buyer’s utility is increasing in the buyer’s
valuation, and the seller’s utility is decreasing in the seller’s valuation: a higher value
buyer and a lower value seller are more keen to trade than a lower value buyer and a
higher value seller, respectively. As we can see in Figure 1·1, the buyer’s and seller’s
valuations being reflection symmetric means that f b(·) is the mirror image of f s(·),
and vice versa: for a given keenness to trade, the respective likelihoods of the buyer
and seller having that value are equal.
The informed agent has an information set of the partition of the interval [v, v]
about the buyer’s valuation as V b = {Ibi = [vbi , vbi+1]|v = vb0 < vb1 < · · · < vbn = v, i =
0, 1, · · · , n − 1}. Similarly, the agent also has an information set of the partition of
the interval [v, v] about the seller’s valuation as V s = {Isj = [vsj , vsj+1]|v = vs0 < vs1 <
· · · < vsn = v, j = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1}. That is, after the realization of vb, the agent
receives a signal about the buyer’s valuation as one of the elements in V b. Similarly,
after the realization of vs, the agent receives a signal about the seller’s valuation as
one of the elements in V s. For instance, if an interval Ibi = [v
b
i , v
b
i+1] ⊂ [v, v] includes
the realized vb and an interval Isj = [v
s
j , v
s
j+1] ⊂ [v, v] includes the realized vs for some
i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n−1}, the agent knows that the realized vb is within the interval of Ibi
and the realized vs is within the interval of Isj . The agent thus has finer information
about the buyer’s valuation than the seller does because Ibi is a proper subset of
[v, v] for all i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. Likewise, the agent has finer information about the
seller’s valuation than the buyer does because Isj is a proper subset of [v, v] for all
j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1.
Furthermore, I assume reflection-symmetric sets of V b and V s as below.
Assumption 2 vbk − v = v − vsn−k for all k = 0, 1, · · · , n.
As we can see in Figure 1·2, having reflection-symmetric sets of V b and V s means
that the partition structure of the buyer’s valuation is the mirror image of that of the
8Figure 1·2: Reflection-symmetric sets of V b and V s
seller’s valuation, and vice versa: the agent is equally informative to buyer and seller
about the other’s keenness to trade. To illustrate, if the agent has an information
partition of the buyer’s valuation that is finer on the lower value side, then the
information partition possessed for the seller’s valuation is finer on the higher value
side. That is to say, if the agent has finer information about a buyer who is less
keen to trade than a buyer who is more keen to trade, then the agent also has finer
information about a seller who is less keen to trade than a seller who is more keen to
trade with the same magnitude as for the buyer.
Furthermore, I define two kinds of informed agents: a price-maximizing agent and
a trade-maximizing agent. The utility of the price-maximizing agent is increasing in
the expected sales price, and that of the trade-maximizing agent is increasing in the
probability of trade.
Note that I assume the agent gets the utility from the expected sales price or the
probability of trade rather than being paid by the buyer and seller based on either
of those parameters. As I mentioned in Section 1.1, I study the informed agent’s
strategic behavior during the advising stage where the buyer and seller receive some
information from the agent for free. That is, it is cheap talk; the agent’s payoff does
not directly depend on what is said to either buyer or seller. However, after the
advising stage, the agent anticipates some payment from the buyer and seller based
on the final sales price or the fact that they trade the good. This aspect gives an
9incentive for strategic behavior by the agent during the advising stage. Therefore, I
assume that the agent maximizes either the expected sales price or the probability of
trade even without monetary transfer from buyer or seller.
The timeline of the game is as follows. First, nature selects vb from the distribution
of F b over [v, v] and vs from the distribution of F s over [v, v]. Second, the buyer learns
the valuation of the realized vb, and the seller learns the valuation of the realized vs.
At the same time, the agent receives a signal about vb as the interval of Ibi such that
the realized vb is within Ibi for some i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}. Simultaneously, the agent
also receives a signal about vs as the interval of Isj such that the realized v
s is within Isj
for some j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n−1}. Third, the informed agent delivers a private message to
each buyer and seller concerning the valuation interval of the corresponding adversary.
After receiving the message, the buyer and the seller simultaneously submit sealed
offers of b and s, respectively. If b ≥ s, then they trade the good at a price of b+s
2
.
The above structure of the game is common knowledge.
1.3 Bargaining equilibrium
In this section, I analyze the buyer’s and seller’s equilibrium strategies for the bargain-
ing game. Among the multiple potential equilibria, I only consider those strategies
that give the most efficient outcome.4
Consider the realized vb ∈ [vb, vb] ⊂ [v, v] and the realized vs ∈ [vs, vs] ⊂ [v, v].
Assume that [vb, vb], the support of the realized vb, and [vs, vs], the support of the
realized vs, are common knowledge.
If vb ≥ vs, then the buyer and seller can trade the good with certainty as the
buyer’s valuation is always greater than or equal to the seller’s valuation. Their
equilibrium strategies are b = s ∈ [vs, vb]. Otherwise, they cannot trade the good with
4For the detailed multiplicity of the equilibria, see Leininger et al. (1989)
10
certainty. In this case, I consider their equilibrium strategies as in Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) such that the buyer’s offer strategy b(·) and the seller’s offer strategy
s(·) are assumed to be bounded above and below and to be strictly increasing and
differentiable except possibly at these offer bounds. The following lemma summarizes
the equilibrium strategies of the buyer and seller.
Lemma 1 Suppose it is common knowledge that [vb, vb] ⊂ [v, v] includes the realized
vb and that [vs, vs] ⊂ [v, v] includes the realized vs. Let b˜(·) and s˜(·) be the solutions
to the simultaneous differential equations (1.1) and (1.2) for x, y ∈ [v, v].
1
2
F b(y)s˜′(y) + f b(y)s˜(y) = b˜−1(s˜(y))f b(y) (1.1)
1
2
(1− F s(x))b˜′(x)− f s(x)b˜(x) = −s˜−1(b˜(x))f s(x) (1.2)
(i) If vb < vs, then the buyer’s and seller’s equilibrium strategies are b(vb) = b˜(vb)
and s(vs) = s˜(vs) with the following boundary conditions:
1) If b˜(vb) > s˜(vs), then b(vb) = s˜(vs) for vb > b˜−1(s˜(vs))
2) If b˜(vb) < s˜(vs), then s(vs) = v for vs > b˜(vb)
3) If b˜(vb) > s˜(vs), then s(vs) = b˜(vb) for vs < s˜−1(b˜(vb))
4) If b˜(vb) < s˜(vs), then b(vb) = v for vb < s˜(vs)
(ii) Otherwise, the buyer’s and seller’s equilibrium strategies are b(vb) = s(vs) ∈
[vs, vb] for all vb ∈ [vb, vb] and vs ∈ [vs, vs].
As we can see in (ii) of Lemma 1, if the buyer and seller can trade the good with
certainty, there exist multiple equilibria. In each equilibrium, the buyer’s offer and
the seller’s offer should be the same and within the interval of [vs, vb], regardless of
their respective valuations.
However, if the buyer and seller cannot trade the good with certainty, their offers
vary according to each party’s valuation. To illustrate, let me classify buyer and seller
into three types each: low-, medium-, and high-value buyer; and low-, medium-, and
high-value seller. If vb is less than s˜(vs), this is a low-value buyer; if vb is higher than
b˜−1(s˜(vs)), this is a high-value buyer; and otherwise, this is a medium-value buyer.
11
Similarly, if vs is less than s˜−1(b˜(vb)), this is a low-value seller; if vs is higher than
b˜(vb), this is a high-value seller; and otherwise, this is a medium-value seller.
As we can see in the first boundary condition in (i) of Lemma 1, a high-value
buyer’s offer, according to the offer function b˜(·), is always higher than the seller’s
offer: a high-value buyer trades the good with certainty. Thus, the offer function
b˜(·) is suboptimal. If the buyer matches the highest-value seller’s offer, then the
expected sales price is lower than in the case where the buyer uses the offer function
b˜(·) while still trading the good with certainty. Therefore, a high-value buyer matches
the highest-value seller’s offer.
In contrast, as shown in the fourth boundary condition in (i) of Lemma 1, a
low-value buyer cannot trade at all because the seller’s offer is always higher than
the buyer’s valuation of the good. Thus, the low-value buyer just submits v, which
certainly makes the probability of trade zero.5
Similarly but symmetrically, as we can see in the third boundary condition in (i)
of Lemma 1, a low-value seller’s offer, according to the offer function s˜(·), is always
lower than the buyer’s offer: a low-value seller trades the good with certainty. Thus,
the offer function s˜(·) is suboptimal. If the seller matches the lowest-value buyer’s
offer, then the expected sales price is higher than in the case where the seller uses the
offer function s˜(·) while still trading the good with certainty. Therefore, a low-value
seller matches the lowest-value buyer’s offer.
In contrast, as shown in the second boundary condition in (i) of Lemma 1, a
high-value seller cannot trade at all because the buyer’s offer is always lower than the
seller’s valuation of the good. Thus, the high-value seller submits v, which certainly
makes the probability of trade zero.6
5In the equilibrium strategies described in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), a low-value buyer
can submit any number less than s˜(vs) because all offers result in zero probability of trade. I only
consider the equilibrium in which the low-value buyer submits v.
6As with the footnote 5, I only consider the equilibrium in which the high-value seller submits v.
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A medium-value buyer uses the offer function b˜(·), which is optimal for the buyer
given the seller’s strategy. Similarly, a medium-value seller uses the offer function
s˜(·), which is optimal for the seller given the buyer’s strategy.
Note that a high-value buyer trades the good with certainty, a medium-value
buyer trades with probability less than 1, and a low-value buyer does not trade at
all. Similarly but symmetrically, a low-value seller trades the good with certainty, a
medium-value seller trades with probability less than 1, and a high-value seller does
not trade at all.
1.4 Information dissemination by the informed agent
As I assumed in Section 1.2, the informed agent receives a signal about the buyer’s
valuation as one of the elements in V b = {Ibi = [vbi , vbi+1]|v = vb0 < vb1 < · · · < vbn =
v, i = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1} and a signal about the seller’s valuation as one of the elements
in V s = {Isj = [vsj , vsj+1]|v = vs0 < vs1 < · · · < vsn = v, j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1}.7
After the agent receives these signals, and before the buyer and seller submit their
respective offers, the agent delivers a private message to each party. The message
space to the seller about the buyer’s valuation is denoted by M b, and the message
space to the buyer about the seller’s valuation is denoted by M s. Thus, the agent’s
strategy for the buyer side is ms : V s →M s, and for the seller side is mb : V b →M b.
In the rest of this chapter, I consider a bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed
information that the agent truthfully disseminates information to the buyer and seller,
and in which the buyer and seller follow the equilibrium strategies described in Lemma
1.8 Then, without loss of generality, the message spaces can be assumed as M b =
7If the realized vb = vbi for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − 1}, then the informed agent receives a signal
of either Ibi−1 = [v
b
i−1, v
b
i ] or I
b
i = [v
b
i , v
b
i+1] with a half probability each. The buyer observes what
the agent receives. The same occurs on the seller’s side.
8The bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information is similar to the fully revealing
equilibrium in Suvorov and Tsybuleva (2010)
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{mbi = [vbi , vbi+1]|i = 0, 1, · · ·n − 1}, and M s = {msj = [vsj , vsj+1]|j = 0, 1, · · ·n − 1}.
In other words, the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information consists of
the agent’s message ms(·) to the buyer, the agent’s message mb(·) to the seller, and
the buyer’s and seller’s offer strategies such that: (1) for each j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1},
ms(Isj ) = m
s
j ; (2) for each i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}, mb(Ibi ) = mbi ; and (3) the buyer and
seller follow the strategies described in Lemma 1.
I need the following lemma for the main result.
Lemma 2 (i) Consider the two cases wherein vs ∈ [vsj , vsj+1] and vs ∈ [vsl , vsl+1] such
that j 6= l for some j, l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}. Let b˜j(·) and b˜l(·) be the solutions of b˜(·)
in Lemma 1 corresponding to vs ∈ [vsj , vsj+1] and vs ∈ [vsl , vsl+1], respectively. Then,
whenever j > l, b˜j(v
b) > b˜l(v
b) for all vb.
(ii) Consider the two cases wherein vb ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] and vb ∈ [vbk, vbk+1] such that
i 6= k for some i, k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}. Let s˜i(·) and s˜k(·) be the solutions of s˜(·)
in Lemma 1 corresponding to vb ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] and vb ∈ [vbk, vbk+1], respectively. Then,
whenever i > k, s˜i(v
s) > s˜k(v
s) for all vs.
Lemma 2 says that a medium-value buyer submits a higher offer when the seller
has a higher value, and a medium-value seller submits a higher offer when the buyer
has a higher value. Thus, if the buyer and seller always accept the agent’s message
as true, the agent can make a party change the offer strategy by delivering false
information about the adversary’s valuation. The following lemma shows how the
agent can influence the buyer’s and seller’s strategies.
Lemma 3 Assume that the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1], and that
vbi < v
s
j+1 for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}. Suppose the buyer and seller always
believe that the informed agent truthfully disseminates the information to the buyer
and seller.
Compared with the true message mbi to the seller,
(i) A false message mbk for some 0 ≤ k < i to the seller makes the seller more
likely to submit v; if the seller submits an offer less than v, the seller submits a lower
offer.
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(ii) A false message mbk for some i < k ≤ n to the seller makes the seller less
likely to submit v; if the seller submits an offer less than v, the seller submits a higher
offer.
Compared with the true message msj to the buyer,
(iii) A false message msl for some j < l ≤ n to the buyer makes the buyer more
likely to submit v; if the buyer submits an offer higher than v, the buyer submits a
higher offer.
(iv) A false message msl for some 0 ≤ l < j to the buyer makes the buyer less
likely to submit v; if the buyer submits an offer higher than v, the buyer submits a
lower offer.
Suppose the agent lies to the seller that the buyer has a lower valuation than the
true state and is believed by the seller. Then, on the one hand, the seller is more
likely to submit v and so does not trade at all. This is due to a medium-value seller
misconceiving that the buyer’s valuation is too low for the trade to occur. On the
other hand, if the seller submits an offer less than v, this offer is lower than in the
case of the agent telling the truth, as a lower offer maximizes expected utility from
the deceived seller’s point of view. These aspects are summarized in (i) of Lemma 3.
Suppose the agent lies to the seller that the buyer has a higher valuation than the
true state and is believed by the seller. Then, on the one hand, the seller is less likely
to submit v. This is caused by a high-value seller misconceiving that the buyer’s
valuation is high enough for the trade to occur. On the other hand, if the seller
submits an offer less than v, this offer is higher than in the case of the agent telling
the truth, as a higher offer maximizes expected utility from the deceived seller’s point
of view. These aspects are summarized in (ii) of Lemma 3.
Suppose the agent lies to the buyer that the seller has a higher valuation than the
true state and is believed by the buyer. Then, on the one hand, the buyer is more
likely to submit v and so does not trade at all. This is due to a medium-value buyer
misconceiving that the seller’s valuation is too high for the trade to occur. On the
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other hand, if the buyer submits an offer higher than v, this offer is higher than in the
case of the agent telling the truth, as a higher offer maximizes expected utility from
the deceived buyer’s point of view. These aspects are summarized in (iii) of Lemma
3.
Suppose the agent lies to the buyer that the seller has a lower valuation than
the true state and is believed by the buyer. Then, on the one hand, the buyer is
less likely to submit v. This is caused by a low-value buyer misconceiving that the
seller’s valuation is low enough for the trade to occur. On the other hand, if the buyer
submits an offer higher than v, this offer is lower than in the case of the agent telling
the truth, as a lower offer maximizes expected utility from the deceived buyer’s point
of view. These aspects are summarized in (iv) of Lemma 3.
Now, I present the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 1 If there exists an equilibrium in which a price-maximizing agent truth-
fully disseminates information to both buyer and seller, then there also exists an
equilibrium in which a trade-maximizing agent truthfully disseminates information to
both buyer and seller.
Theorem 1 says that for any given information partition structure of the informed
agent and the distributions of vb and vs which satisfy the assumptions in Section
1.2, if there exists a bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information when the
informed agent is a price-maximizing agent, then that equilibrium also exists when
the informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent.
However, the converse of Theorem 1 is not true. That is, for some information par-
tition structures of the informed agent and some distributions of vb and vs, there exists
a bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information when the informed agent is
a trade-maximizing agent, but not when the informed agent is a price-maximizing
agent.9
9One example is when both vb and vs are distributed uniformly over [0, 1], and the informed
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Note that the babbling equilibrium in which the informed agent does not dissem-
inate any information at all and thus the buyer and seller complete the bargaining
game without receiving finer information from the agent always exists. The following
lemma indicates that if the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information
exists, then the probability of trade is higher than for the babbling equilibrium case.
Lemma 4 The probability of trade in the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed
information is higher than in the babbling equilibrium.
The above Lemma 4 says that if finer information from the informed agent is
available in the bargaining game, then the probability of trade is higher. As we
can see in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), the bargaining game fails in ex-post
efficiency, which requires the buyer and seller to trade the good as long as the buyer’s
valuation is greater than or equal to the seller’s valuation, because of the incomplete
information between the buyer and seller. That incomplete information leads the
buyer to aggressively submit a lower offer and the seller to aggressively submit a
higher offer than each one’s true valuation of the good. Thus, if we can reduce the
intensity of the information incompleteness between the buyer and seller, we can
increase the probability of trade, which makes for smaller ex-post inefficiency. In
my model, the informed agent can effect this because disseminating finer information
causes the buyer and seller to submit less aggressive offers.
Moreover, as illustrated in the following lemma, if the bargaining equilibrium with
fully revealed information exists, then its expected sales price is also higher than in
the case of the babbling equilibrium.
Lemma 5 The expected sales price in the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed
information is higher than in the babbling equilibrium.
agent’s information sets are V b = {[0, 4/7], [4/7, 1]} and V s = {[0, 3/7], [3/7, 1]}.
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Note that the bargaining rule in which the buyer and seller trade the good at the
average of their offers when the buyer’s offer is greater than or equal to the seller’s
offer does not lean toward either buyer or seller. Moreover, the buyer’s valuation and
the seller’s valuation are reflection symmetric by Assumption 1. Also, note that by
Assumption 2, the informed agent is equally informative to both buyer and seller, as
I mentioned in Section 1.2. Thus, as demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 5, the main
reason for the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information having a higher
expected sales price than the babbling equilibrium is that it has a higher probability
of trade.
Now, I can compare trade-maximizing and price-maximizing agents in terms of the
probability of trade and expected sales price. The below two corollaries hold under
the assumption that the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information is
selected over the babbling equilibrium if it exists.
Corollary 2 In the bargaining game with an informed agent, a trade-maximizing
agent leads to a weakly higher probability of trade than a price-maximizing agent.
Corollary 3 In the bargaining game with an informed agent, a trade-maximizing
agent leads to a weakly higher expected sales price than a price-maximizing agent.
Corollary 2 sounds trivial, but Corollary 3 does not. As we can see in Theorem 1,
and as I mentioned after the theorem, there are some cases where a trade-maximizing
agent makes finer information available in the market, but a price-maximizing agent
does not. As a result, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher probability of
trade than a price-maximizing agent, which means weakly smaller ex-post inefficiency.
Moreover, as I mentioned after Lemma 5, under the reflection-symmetric setting of the
game, a higher probability of trade means a higher expected sales price. Therefore,
a trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher expected sales price than even a
price-maximizing agent, due to having a weakly higher probability of trade.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study a bargaining game with an informed agent who can dissemi-
nate finer information to a buyer and seller. If the agent truthfully disseminates this
information to both the buyer and the seller, then the information incompleteness
between them is reduced. As a result, both buyer and seller submit their offers in a
less aggressive way. This has the effect of reducing ex-post inefficiency, which always
exists in a bargaining game under incomplete information.
In this context, I compare two different kinds of informed agents, a price-maximizing
agent and a trade-maximizing agent. I show that if a price-maximizing agent dis-
seminates information truthfully to the buyer and seller in equilibrium, so does a
trade-maximizing agent. That is, without any specific assumptions on the informa-
tion structure of the informed agent and the distributions of the buyer’s and seller’s
valuations of the good, we do not know whether there exists a bargaining equilib-
rium with fully revealed information, but if this equilibrium exists when the informed
agent is a price-maximizing agent, then it also exists when the informed agent is a
trade-maximizing agent.
Furthermore, the converse of the above statement is not true. That is, for some
cases, a bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information exists when the in-
formed agent is a trade-maximizing agent, but it does not exist when the informed
agent is a price-maximizing agent. As a result, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a
higher probability of trade, which means smaller ex-post inefficiency, and also leads
to a higher expected sales price than even a price-maximizing agent due to that
higher probability. This is because finer information is available in the market when
the agent is a trade-maximizing agent, but it is not available when the agent is a
price-maximizing agent.
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Chapter 2
Informed Agent’s Advice
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the model in the previous chapter under specific assumptions.
Here, I assume that both buyer’s and seller’s valuations are uniformly distributed,
and an informed agent knows whether each of the buyer and seller has a high or low
valuation.
We can interpret the setting as follows. When each of the buyer and seller has a
high (low) valuation, it is a seller’s (buyer’s) market. When a buyer has a high (low)
valuation but a seller has a low (high) valuation, it is an expansion (a recession).
The agent knows the current market condition as one of a seller’s market, a buyer’s
market, an expansion, or a recession, and the agent can advise each buyer and seller
about it.
Thus, there are four possible equilibria: (1) a babbling equilibrium in which an
informed agent delivers no information at all, (2) a bargaining equilibrium in which an
informed agent truthfully advises a buyer only, (3) a bargaining equilibrium in which
an informed agent truthfully advises a seller only, and (4) a bargaining equilibrium
in which an informed agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller1. Note that the
babbling equilibrium always exists.
I show that a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises
1A bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller is
the same as a bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information in Chapter 1.
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a seller only always exists regardless of whether the agent is a trade-maximizing agent
or a price-maximizing agent. A bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent
truthfully advises a buyer only and a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed
agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller always exist when the agent is a trade-
maximizing agent. However, when the agent is a price-maximizing agent, the above
two equilibria do not always exist.
The intuition behind the above results is as follows. If an informed agent dissem-
inates information about the market condition, the trade between a buyer and seller
is more likely to occur. A trade-maximizing agent always disseminates the informa-
tion because the agent’s utility is increasing in the probability of trade. However,
a price-maximizing agent’s utility is increasing in the expected sales price. That is,
a price-maximizing agent’s interest and a seller’s interest are perfectly aligned, but
a price-maximizing agent’s interest conflicts with a buyer’s interest. Therefore, a
price-maximizing agent is always truthful for a seller, but not always for a buyer.
In other words, a trade-maximizing agent makes more detailed information avail-
able in the market than a price-maximizing agent. As a result, a trade-maximizing
agent leads to a weakly higher probability of trade than a price-maximizing agent.
Moreover, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher expected sales price
than even a price-maximizing agent due to the weakly higher trade probability.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model
setting in this chapter. Section 2.3 analyzes the case where an informed agent advises
a buyer only. The case that an informed agent advises a seller only is presented in
Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 studies the case that an informed agent advises both
buyer and seller. I conclude in Section 2.6. All the proofs of results in this chapter
are in Appendix B.
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2.2 Basic setting
The basic setting of the model and notations in this chapter are similar to those in the
previous chapter. There are three players: a buyer, a seller, and an informed agent. I
assume that the seller owns an indivisible good that the buyer wants to obtain. The
valuations of the buyer and the seller are denoted by vb and vs, respectively. The
buyer and seller are risk neutral, and each has an additively separable utility for the
good and money. If they trade the good at a price of p, the buyer’s utility is vb − p,
and the seller’s utility is p− vs. Their utilities are normalized to 0 if no trade occurs.
Moreover, I assume that vb and vs are independent random variables distributed
uniformly over [0, 1].2 That is, F b(v) = F s(v) = v and f b(v) = f s(v) = 1 for all
v ∈ [0, 1]. Note that F b(v) = 1 − F s(1 − v) for all v ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, it satisfies
Assumption 1 in Chapter 1, reflection-symmetric valuations of buyer and seller.
The informed agent has an information set of the partition of the interval [0, 1]
about the buyer’s valuation as V b = {Ib0 = [0, y], Ib1 = [y, 1]|0 ≤ y ≤ 1}. Similarly,
the agent also has an information set of the partition of the interval [0, 1] about the
seller’s valuation as V s = {Is0 = [0, 1 − y], Is1 = [1 − y, 1]|0 ≤ y ≤ 1}.3 That is, after
the realization of vb, the agent knows whether the buyer has a high (vb ∈ [y, 1]) or low
(vb ∈ [0, y]) valuation. Similarly, after the realization of vs, the agent knows whether
the seller has a high (vs ∈ [1− y, 1]) or low (vs ∈ [0, 1− y]) valuation. Note that the
value of y denotes the agent’s information structure. Also, note that y = 1− (1− y)
for all y ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, it satisfies Assumption 2 in Chapter 1, reflection-symmetric
sets of V b and V s.
After the agent knows whether each of the buyer and seller has a high or low
valuation, the agent delivers a private message to each party. The message space to
2We can also interpret this model as there are unit continua of buyers and sellers.
3The informed agent’s information sets are the same as in Suvorov and Tsybuleva (2010)
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the seller about the buyer’s valuation is denoted by M b, and the message space to
the buyer about the seller’s valuation is denoted by M s. Thus, the agent’s strategy
for the buyer side is ms : V s →M s, and for the seller side is mb : V b →M b.
In the rest of this chapter, I consider equilibria in which the agent truthfully
advises the buyer only, the seller only, and both the buyer and seller. Thus, without
loss of generality, the message spaces can be assumed as M b = {mb0 = [0, y],mb1 =
[y, 1]|0 ≤ y ≤ 1} and M s = {ms0 = [0, 1− y],ms1 = [1− y, 1]|0 ≤ y ≤ 1}.
As in Chapter 1, I define two kinds of informed agents: a price-maximizing agent
and a trade-maximizing agent. The utility of the price-maximizing agent is increasing
in the expected sales price, and that of the trade-maximizing agent is increasing in
the probability of trade.
The timeline of the game is as follows: First, nature selects vb and vs from the
uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Second, the buyer learns the valuation of the realized
vb, and the seller learns the valuation of the realized vs. At the same time, the agent
receives a signal about vb as the interval of Ibi such that the realized v
b is within Ibi
for some i ∈ {0, 1}. Simultaneously, the agent also receives a signal about vs as the
interval of Isj such that the realized v
s is within Isj for some j ∈ {0, 1}. Third, the
informed agent delivers a private message to each buyer and seller concerning the
valuation interval of the corresponding adversary. After receiving the message, the
buyer and the seller simultaneously submit sealed offers of b and s, respectively. If
b ≥ s, then they trade the good at a price of b+s
2
. The above structure of the game is
common knowledge.
The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 1 in Chapter 1.
Lemma 6 Consider intervals [vb, vb] ⊂ [0, 1] and [vs, vs] ⊂ [0, 1]. Suppose it is com-
mon knowledge that [vb, vb] includes the realized vb and that [vs, vs] includes the realized
vs. Let
b˜(vb) =
2
3
vb +
1
12
vb +
1
4
vs, (2.1)
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and
s˜(vs) =
2
3
vs +
1
4
vb +
1
12
vs. (2.2)
(i) If vb < vs, then the buyer’s and seller’s equilibrium strategies are b(vb) = b˜(vb)
and s(vs) = s˜(vs) with the following boundary conditions:
1) If vb > 4
3
vs − 1
3
vs, then b(vb) = 2
3
vs + 1
4
vb + 1
12
vs for vb > vs + 1
4
(vb − vs)
2) If vb < 4
3
vs − 1
3
vs, then s(vs) = 1 for vs > 3
4
vb + 1
4
vs
3) If 4
3
vb − 1
3
vb > vs, then s(vs) = 2
3
vb + 1
12
vb + 1
4
vs for vs < vb − 1
4
(vb − vs)
4) If 4
3
vb − 1
3
vb < vs, then b(vb) = 0 for vb < 3
4
vs + 1
4
vb
(ii) Otherwise, the buyer’s and seller’s equilibrium strategies are b(vb) = s(vs) ∈
[vs, vb] for all vb ∈ [vb, vb] and vs ∈ [vs, vs].
In the rest of the chapter, if vb ≥ vs, I consider the buyer’s and seller’s equilibrium
strategies as b(vb) = s(vs) = v
b+vs
2
for all vb ∈ [vb, vb] and vs ∈ [vs, vs] among the
multiple equilibria in (ii) of Lemma 6.
Note that the babbling equilibrium in which the informed agent delivers no infor-
mation at all and thus the buyer and seller do the bargaining game as in Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1983) always exists. Based on the above setting, there are three
other candidate equilibria: (1) a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent
truthfully advises a buyer only, (2) a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed
agent truthfully advises a seller only, and (3) a bargaining equilibrium in which an
informed agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller. In the following sections, I
consider those equilibria.
2.3 Advice for a buyer
In this section, I consider a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truth-
fully advises a buyer only. That is, it consists of the agent’s message ms(·) to the
buyer and the buyer’s and seller’s strategies such that: (1) for each j ∈ {0, 1},
ms(Isj ) = m
s
j , and (2) the buyer and seller follow the strategies described in Lemma
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6. Note that the agent reveals information only to the buyer and babbles to the seller
in this equilibrium.
The below two theorems say that the equilibrium exists when the agent is a trade-
maximizing agent, but when the agent is a price-maximizing agent, the existence of
the equilibrium depends on the value of y, the information structure of the agent.
Theorem 4 Suppose an informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent and can only
advise a buyer. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truthfully reveals
information.
Theorem 5 Suppose an informed agent is a price-maximizing agent and can only
advise a buyer. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truthfully reveals
information if and only if y ∈ [0, 3
√
41−17
4
≈ 0.5523].
As we can see in Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and the proofs of those in Appendix
B, when an informed agent advises a buyer only, a trade-maximizing agent always
truthfully advises a buyer. However, for some values of y, a price-maximizing agent
has an incentive to lie to a buyer that a seller has a high valuation (vs ∈ [1− y, 1]) in
order to increase the buyer’s offer and thus to increase the sales price when the seller
actually has a low valuation (vs ∈ [0, 1 − y]). If that is the case, it goes back to the
babbling equilibrium where the common knowledge is that vb and vs are distributed
uniformly over [0, 1]. That is because a price-maximizing agent always says to a buyer
that a seller has a high valuation regardless of the true state.
Note that in the babbling equilibrium, the probability of trade is 9
32
and the
expected sales price is 9
64
as we can see in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). The
below two lemmas say that the agent’s truthful advice for a buyer makes a weakly
higher probability of trade as well as a weakly higher expected sales price relative to
the babbling equilibrium.
Lemma 7 In a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises
a buyer only, the probability of trade is weakly higher than in the babbling equilibrium.
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Lemma 8 In a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises
a buyer only, the expected sales price is weakly higher than in the babbling equilibrium.
The agent’s finer information on a seller’s valuation can make the trade more likely
to occur. Moreover, it also leads to a higher expected sales price due to the higher
probability of trade. On the one hand, the finer information on a seller’s valuation
is always available in the market when the agent is a trade-maximizing agent. On
the other hand, when the agent is a price-maximizing agent, the finer information is
not available in the market for all y ∈ (3
√
41−17
4
, 1] as we can see in Theorem 5. As
a result, under the assumption that an equilibrium with finer information is selected
over the babbling equilibrium if it exists, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher
probability of trade and a higher expected sales price than a price-maximizing agent
for all y ∈ (3
√
41−17
4
, 1).4 The following corollaries summarize the above aspects.
Corollary 6 A trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher probability of trade
than a price-maximizing agent.
Corollary 7 A trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher expected sales price
than a price-maximizing agent.
Corollary 6 sounds trivial, but Corollary 7 does not. As I mentioned above,
because a price-maximizing agent always says to a buyer that a seller has a high
valuation for all y ∈ (3
√
41−17
4
, 1], the agent’s message is not credible to the buyer in
that case. Consequently, the agent’s finer information on a seller’s valuation is not
available in the market, and thus it goes back to the babbling equilibrium. For this
reason, a price-maximizing agent leads to a lower expected sales price than even a
trade-maximizing agent due to a lower probability of trade.
4Note that y = 1 means an uninformed agent. Thus, there is no difference between a trade-
maximizing agent and a price-maximizing agent.
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2.4 Advice for a seller
In this section, I consider a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truth-
fully advises a seller only. That is, it consists of the agent’s message mb(·) to the seller
and the buyer’s and seller’s strategies such that: (1) for each i ∈ {0, 1}, mb(Ibi ) = mbi ,
and (2) the buyer and seller follow the strategies described in Lemma 6. Note that
the agent reveals information only to the seller and babbles to the buyer in this
equilibrium.
The below two theorems say that the equilibrium exists regardless of whether an
informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent or a price-maximizing agent.
Theorem 8 Suppose an informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent and can only
advise a seller. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truthfully reveals
information.
Theorem 9 Suppose an informed agent is a price-maximizing agent and can only
advise a seller. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truthfully reveals
information.
As we can see in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, when an informed agent advises
a seller only, both a trade-maximizing agent and a price-maximizing agent always
truthfully advise a seller.
In contrast with Section 2.3, a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent
truthfully advises a seller only always exists even when the agent is a price-maximizing
agent. That is because both a price-maximizing agent and a seller prefer a higher
expected sales price. In other words, a seller’s interest and a price-maximizing agent’s
interest perfectly coincide, and thus a price-maximizing agent always truthfully ad-
vises a seller.
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2.5 Advice for both buyer and seller
In this section, I consider a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truth-
fully advises both buyer and seller. That is, it consists of the agent’s message ms(·)
to the buyer, the agent’s message mb(·) to the seller, and the buyer’s and seller’s
strategies such that: (1) for each j ∈ {0, 1}, ms(Isj ) = msj ; (2) for each i ∈ {0, 1},
mb(Ibi ) = m
b
i ; and (3) the buyer and seller follow the strategies described in Lemma
6.
The below two theorems say that the equilibrium exists when the agent is a trade-
maximizing agent, but when the agent is a price-maximizing agent, the existence of
the equilibrium depends on the value of y, the information structure of the agent.
Theorem 10 Suppose an informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent and advises
both buyer and seller. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truthfully
disseminates information.
Theorem 11 Suppose an informed agent is a price-maximizing agent and advises
both buyer and seller. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truth-
fully disseminates information if and only if y ∈ [0, 1
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{10 − 5×222/3
(27+7
√
71)1/3
+ (22(27 +
7
√
71))1/3} ≈ 0.4819] or y ∈ [1
2
, 17−
√
193
6
≈ 0.5179].
Corollary 12 If there exists an equilibrium in which a price-maximizing agent truth-
fully advises both buyer and seller, then there also exists an equilibrium in which a
trade-maximizing agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller.
As we can see in the above Theorem 10 and Theorem 11, when an informed agent
advises both sides of the buyer and seller, a trade-maximizing agent always truthfully
advises them. However, a price-maximizing agent truthfully advises the buyer and
seller only for some values of y. Thus, we can check that Theorem 1 in Chapter 1
holds in the model of this chapter as we can see in Corollary 12.
Note that there are four possible equilibria in this chapter: (1) a babbling equi-
librium in which an informed agent delivers no information at all, (2) a bargaining
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equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises a buyer only, (3) a bargain-
ing equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises a seller only, and (4) a
bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises both buyer and
seller. Also, note that the babbling equilibrium always exists.
The below two corollaries show the conditions under which each equilibrium exists
when an informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent and a price-maximizing agent,
respectively.
Corollary 13 Suppose an informed agent is a trade-maximizing agent. Then, there
exist all of the possible four equilibria.
Corollary 14 Suppose an informed agent is a price-maximizing agent. Then,
(i) there exist two equilibria, which are the babbling equilibrium and a bargaining
equilibrium in which the agent truthfully advises a seller only, for y ∈ (3
√
41−17
4
, 1].
(ii) there exist three equilibria, but not a bargaining equilibrium in which the agent
truthfully advises both buyer and seller, for y ∈ ( 1
28
{10 − 5×222/3
(27+7
√
71)1/3
+ (22(27 +
7
√
71))1/3}, 1
2
) and y ∈ (17−
√
193
6
, 3
√
41−17
4
].
(iii) there exist all of the possible four equilibria for y ∈ [0, 1
28
{10 − 5×222/3
(27+7
√
71)1/3
+
(22(27 + 7
√
71))1/3}] and y ∈ [1
2
, 17−
√
193
6
].
As we can see in Corollary 13, when an informed agent is a trade-maximizing
agent, all of the possible four equilibria, which are the babbling equilibrium, a bar-
gaining equilibrium in which the agent truthfully advises a buyer only, a bargaining
equilibrium in which the agent truthfully advises a seller only, and a bargaining equi-
librium in which the agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller, exist.
However, as we can see in Corollary 14, when an informed agent is a price-
maximizing agent, the existence of the equilibria depends on the value of y. As
we saw in the proofs of Theorem 5 and Theorem 11, for some values of y, a price-
maximizing agent has an incentive to lie to a buyer that a seller has a high valuation
in order to increase the buyer’s offer and thus to increase the sales price when the
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seller actually has a low valuation. That is, in that case, a price-maximizing agent
always says to a buyer that a seller has a high valuation regardless of the true state.
Therefore, it makes the agent’s advice for the buyer incredible, and thus the truthful
advice for the buyer is not an equilibrium in that case.
The following lemma compares the probability of trade in each equilibrium.
Lemma 9 The probability of trade in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed
agent truthfully advises a buyer only
(i) is the same as in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully
advises a seller only.
(ii) is weakly higher than in the babbling equilibrium.
(iii) is weakly lower than in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent
truthfully advises both buyer and seller.
The following lemma compares the expected sales price in each equilibrium.
Lemma 10 (i) For y ∈ [0, 2(8+3
√
3)
37
≈ 0.7133] (y ∈ [2(8+3
√
3)
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, 1]), the expected sales
price in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises a buyer
only is weakly higher (lower) than in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed
agent truthfully advises a seller only.
(ii) The expected sales price in the babbling equilibrium is weakly lower than all other
equilibria.
(iii) The expected sales price in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent
truthfully advises both buyer and seller is weakly higher than all other equilibria.
The agent’s finer information can make the trade more likely to occur. On the
one hand, the finer information is always available in the market when the agent is
a trade-maximizing agent. On the other hand, when the agent is a price-maximizing
agent, the finer information is not fully available in the market for some values of
y. As a result, under the assumption that an equilibrium with finer information is
selected if it exists, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher probability of trade
and a higher expected sales price than a price-maximizing agent in that case. The
following corollaries summarize the above aspects.
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Corollary 15 A trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher probability of trade
than a price-maximizing agent.
Corollary 16 A trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher expected sales price
than a price-maximizing agent.
Again, Corollary 15 sounds trivial, but Corollary 16 does not. As I mentioned
above, because a price-maximizing agent has an incentive to lie to a buyer that a
seller has a high valuation regardless of the true state for some values of y, the agent’s
message is not credible to the buyer in that case. Consequently, the agent’s finer
information is not fully available in the market. For this reason, a price-maximizing
agent leads to a lower expected sales price than even a trade-maximizing agent due
to a lower probability of trade.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyze the model in the previous chapter under specific assump-
tions. We can check that all possible equilibria, which are the babbling equilibrium, a
bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises a buyer only, a
bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises a seller only, and
a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises both buyer
and seller, always exist when the agent is a trade-maximizing agent. However, when
the agent is a price-maximizing agent, the existence of the equilibria depends on the
value of y, which is the agent’s information structure.
A trade-maximizing agent’s interest is to make the trade between buyer and seller
more likely to occur and thus does not lean toward either side of a buyer or a seller.
However, a price-maximizing agent wants to make the trade at a higher price and
thus leans toward a seller’s interest. Therefore, a price-maximizing agent is always
truthful for a seller but not always for a buyer, while a trade-maximizing agent is
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always truthful for both buyer and seller.
As a result, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a weakly higher probability of trade
than a price-maximizing agent. Moreover, a trade-maximizing agent also leads to a
weakly higher expected sales price than even a price-maximizing agent due to the
weakly higher probability of trade.
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Chapter 3
Percentage Commission versus Fixed
Commission: Evidence from the South
Korean Real Estate Market
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I empirically test the implications of the models from previous chap-
ters using South Korean housing transaction data from 2006 to 2017. That is, I test
whether a trade-maximizing agent actually leads to a higher probability of trade, and
therefore smaller ex-post inefficiency, than a price-maximizing agent.
In South Korea, real estate agents receive a percentage commission if they match
and close a deal between a buyer and a seller. That is, the real estate agent receives
some percentage of the sales price. However, there are five intervals of sales prices, and
the commission rates in each interval are different. Some intervals feature maximum
limits on the commission. Consequently, in some subintervals of sales prices, every
real estate agent receives a fixed amount of money regardless of sales price.
If a real estate agent receives an unrestricted percentage commission, then that
agent’s incentive is the same as for the price-maximizing agent; the agent’s expected
payoff depends on the expected sales price. In contrast, if a real estate agent receives
a fixed commission regardless of the sales price, then the agent’s incentive is the same
as that of the trade-maximizing agent; the agent’s expected payoff depends solely
on the probability of trade. Therefore, I can compare those two kinds of informed
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agents by comparing the percentage commission intervals with the fixed commission
intervals.
However, the original data source does not include listing activities. Although I
observe the number of sales, I cannot directly measure the probability of trade due to
the missing listing data. Therefore, I apply cluster analysis, which is an unsupervised
machine learning algorithm, on top of the above identification strategy. This analysis
groups together time periods that have the same average number of listings; by setting
these as fixed effect groups in my regression model, I am able to use the number of
sales as a proxy for the probability of trade. The results from the regression show
that a trade-maximizing agent brings an approximately 0.2% greater number of sales
in each ten-day period than a price-maximizing agent.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1.1, I briefly review
the related literature. Section 3.2 presents the Korean real estate agents’ commission
scheme and the data used in the empirical test. In Section 3.3, I introduce the cluster
analysis. Section 3.4 presents regression models, and Section 3.5 shows results. I
conclude in Section 3.6.
3.1.1 Literature review
This chapter is concerned with the real estate market. In this section, I briefly
highlight some of the existing literature on this topic.
Zietz and Sirmans (2011) extensively review the literature of real estate brokerage
research over the first decade of the 2000s, including efficiency, technology, perfor-
mance, and agency relationships. I highlight some of this research here. Rutherford
et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) compare sales of agent-owned properties
with those of client-owned properties. Both papers find that agent-owned properties
sell at higher premiums than client-owned properties. However, the latter paper finds
that agent-owned properties stay on the market longer than client-owned properties,
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while the former finds no significant difference in selling times. Huang and Ruther-
ford (2007) similarly compare realtor listings with non-realtor listings. They find that
non-realtor listings sell at lower prices, take more time to sell, and are less likely to
sell than realtor listings. Miceli et al. (2007) look at the traditional compensation
model for real estate agents; they argue that a percentage commission is socially un-
productive and creates inefficiencies for buyers and sellers. Their work is consistent
with the implication of my dissertation.
Out of the range of the literature review in Zietz and Sirmans (2011), Yinger
(1981) points out the undesirable aspects of a percentage commission for real estate
agents. YavaS¸ and Colwell (1999) indicate that the incentive of a real estate agent
receiving a percentage commission differs from those of a buyer. Bernheim and Meer
(2013) show that for sellers, the cost of using a real estate agent’s service exceeds
its advantages. Some studies suggest alternative commission schemes for real estate
agents (Miceli, 1991; Colwell et al., 1993, 1994). Hendel et al. (2009) compare two
platforms, the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) and the For-Sale-By-Owner (FSBO).
They find that the FSBO, with its strictly non-realtor listings, is less effective in terms
of time to sell and the probability of a sale.
3.2 Background
The main result of the previous chapters is that a trade-maximizing agent is more
likely to reduce the information incompleteness between buyer and seller than a price-
maximizing agent is; this occurs through disseminating finer information to the buyer
and seller. If that is the case, the trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher probability
of trade, which means smaller ex-post inefficiency. In this chapter, I empirically test
whether a trade-maximizing agent actually leads to a higher probability of trade than
a price-maximizing agent.
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For this test, as I mentioned in Section 3.1, I use data from the real estate market.
To compare price-maximizing and trade-maximizing agents, I compare two different
commission schemes for real estate agents: a percentage commission and a fixed
commission.
Under a percentage commission, a real estate agent receives some percentage of the
sales price after a buyer and seller trade a property. As the real estate agent’s payoff
depends on the final sales price, his or her incentive is the same as that of a price-
maximizing agent. In contrast, under a fixed commission, a real estate agent receives
some fixed amount of money after a buyer and seller trade a property, regardless of
the final sales price. As the real estate agent’s payoff depends solely on whether trade
occurs, his or her incentive is the same as that of a trade-maximizing agent. Therefore,
I can compare price-maximizing and trade-maximizing agents by comparing outcomes
under percentage and fixed commissions.
However, it is generally difficult to directly compare these two different commission
schemes using real-world real estate data, due to fixed commissions being uncommon
in the real estate market. Moreover, even though some real estate agents receive fixed
commissions, there exist other real estate agents who receive percentage commissions,
and thus there are self-selection issues. Not only do real estate agents self-select
their commission schemes, but buyers and sellers also self-select a real estate agent
according to the agent’s commission scheme. Therefore, it is difficult to isolate pure
differences between the commission schemes and therefore agent types.
Fortunately, the unique feature of the Korean commission scheme for real estate
agents allows me to compare agents receiving percentage and fixed commissions di-
rectly. Thus, I can do so by using housing transaction data from South Korea. More-
over, as we can see in the following section, I do not need to worry about self-selection
issues in the analysis.
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3.2.1 Real estate agents’ commission scheme in South Korea
Table 3.1: Commission scheme for real estate agents in South Korea
Sales Price* Commission Rate Maximum Limit*
under ₩50 0.6% ₩0.25
₩50 – ₩200 0.5% ₩0.80
₩200 – ₩600 0.4% —
₩600 – ₩900 0.5% —
over ₩900 0.9% —
* In million ₩(Korean currency; approximately 1 US dollar equals 1,000 Korean Won)
Notes: This table shows commissions from one party. If a real estate agent works for both buyer and seller, the agent
receives double the given commission.
Figure 3·1: Real estate agent commissions across sales price intervals
As we can see in Table 3.1, South Korean real estate agents basically receive
percentage commissions. However, the percentage rates differ by sales price intervals,
and these rates are defined by law. Moreover, some intervals feature maximum limits
on commissions, which are defined by law as well. For example, there is a maximum
limit of 250,000 Korean Won for commissions on sales with prices between 0 and 50
million Korean Won. This means that a real estate agent receives 0.6% of the sales
price if the price is between 0 and 41.6 million Korean Won but a constant 250,000
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Korean Won if the sales price is between 41.6 million and 50 million Korean Won.
Therefore, for transactions with sales prices between 0 and 41.6 million Korean Won,
a real estate agent’s incentive is the same as that of a price-maximizing agent, while
for sales prices between 41.6 million and 50 million Korean Won, a real estate agent’s
incentive is the same as that of a trade-maximizing agent.
Similarly, there is another maximum limit for commissions on sales prices within
the interval of 50 million to 200 million Korean Won. Thus, for sales with prices
between 50 million and 160 million Korean Won, a real estate agent receives a per-
centage commission of 0.5%, and for sales with prices between 160 million and 200
million Korean Won, the agent receives a fixed commission of 800,000 Korean Won.
In sum, for sales prices between 41.6 million and 50 million Korean Won and
between 160 million and 200 million Korean Won, a real estate agent’s incentive is
the same as that of a trade-maximizing agent. Across other price intervals, a real
estate agent’s incentive is the same as that of a price-maximizing agent. Therefore,
I can compare the probabilities of trade in those intervals in order to compare the
probabilities of trade for a trade-maximizing agent and a price-maximizing agent.
Furthermore, the above commission scheme is defined by law and is identical for
all real estate agents in South Korea. That is, real estate agents do not self-select
between the two different commission schemes. Moreover, as we can see in Figure 3·2
and Figure 3·3, transactions are not bunching at the thresholds of 41.6, 50, 160, and
200 million Korean Won. This is due to sales prices being the results of bargaining
between buyer and seller. That is, the price is not determined by the real estate agent.
Instead, the real estate agent merely advises the buyer and seller before bargaining
occurs, as I discuss in the first chapter. In sum, real estate agents cannot manipulate
sales prices directly, and that is the reason why transactions are not bunching at the
above thresholds even though the agent’s incentives are different on either side of
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(a) Bin width=10 (b) Bin width=5
Notes: The first red vertical line indicates 41.6 and the second red vertical line indicates 50.
Figure 3·2: Distribution of sales by price below 100 (in million ₩)
those points.
Therefore, the self-selection of the agent is not an issue in the identification strat-
egy of this chapter. In addition, as we can see in Figure 3·1, the amount of the agent’s
commission is continuous at the thresholds of 41.6, 50, 160, and 200 million Korean
Won. Thus, the buyer and seller would pay the same commissions on either side of
those thresholds and so have no incentive to manipulate sales prices.
However, transactions are evidently bunching at the left side of the thresholds
of 600 and 900 million Korean Won, as shown in Figure 3·4; the values of agent
commissions are discontinuous at these thresholds. Specifically, as we can see in
Figure 3·1, the commission amount at a sales price of 600 million Korean Won jumps
from 2.4 to 3 million Korean Won, and at a sales price of 900 million Korean Won, the
commission amount jumps from 4.5 to 8.1 million Korean Won. Therefore, if the sales
price is slightly above those thresholds, both buyer and seller want to manipulate it
to be slightly lower so that they will pay less commission to the agent. Nevertheless,
these bunching points remain within percentage commission intervals, and thus the
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Notes: The first red vertical line indicates 160 and the second red vertical line indicates 200. The width of each bin
is 10.
Figure 3·3: Distribution of sales by price between 100 and 500 (in
million ₩)
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Notes: The first red vertical line indicates 600 and the second red vertical line indicates 900. The width of each bin
is 15.
Figure 3·4: Distribution of sales by price between 500 and 1,300 (in
million ₩)
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self-selection of buyers and sellers is also not an issue for the identification strategy of
this chapter. In the following section, I describe the data that I use in the analysis.
3.2.2 Data
In South Korea, all real estate transactions should be declared to the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, which provides an open application program-
ming interface for the transaction data, excluding private and personal information.
Thus, I can access data on all South Korean real estate transactions from 2006 to
2017.
From this data, I specifically utilize housing transactions involving multi-unit
apartment buildings for two reasons. First, the majority of the population lives in
such buildings. Second, multi-unit apartment buildings in South Korea are usually
large and contain hundreds of standardized units in each building, and thus a large
number of transactions can be categorized according to a few types of units. This is
a substantial advantage for dealing with the data, as unobserved unit characteristics
can be controlled using a fixed effect model.
Within the above data source, I observe a total of 7,062,423 housing transactions
involving multi-unit apartment buildings from 2006 to 2017. For each transaction, I
have access to the sales price, sales date (in terms of ten-day periods encompassing
the beginning, middle, or end of each month), unit type, floor of the unit, location of
the building, and year of the building’s construction.
I drop 2,132 observations that are lacking or have incorrect information on the
unit type or floor1 or for which the recorded sales year precedes the year in which
the building was constructed. With the remaining 7,060,291 observations, I build
unbalanced panel data by apartment unit type and time of sale. I then generate
1For example, some observations have no information about their unit types or have nonpositive
floor values.
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the number of sales for each apartment unit type in each time period2. The built
unbalanced panel data comprise a total of 4,585,859 observations spanning 126,396
apartment unit types3.
3.3 Cluster analysis
I use the number of sales in each time period as a proxy for the probability of trade,
as the number of sales tends to be increasing in the probability of trade. However,
this relationship is not always true. Even when the probability of trade is low, a large
number of listings can still result in a large number of sales. Unfortunately, I cannot
observe listing activities in this dataset; thus, I cannot directly use the number of
sales as a proxy for the probability of trade. In the remaining part of this section, I
discuss how to solve this issue.
The following theorem shows that the number of listings and the number of sales
in a specific time period are Poisson distributed under some conditions.
Theorem 17 Let n be the total number of apartment units, p be the probability of
listing a unit, q be the probability of a sale, and r be the probability of the unit remain-
ing listed after failing to sell. If n → ∞ , p
1−(1−p)(1−q)r → 0, and pq1−(1−p)(1−q)r → 0
as np
1−(1−p)(1−q)r and
npq
1−(1−p)(1−q)r converge to finite limits, then the number of listings
and the number of sales in each time period are Poisson distributed with parameters
of np
1−(1−p)(1−q)r and
npq
1−(1−p)(1−q)r , respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C.
According to Theorem 17, if each apartment unit type is represented by a large
enough number of units, the probability of a new listing is both small enough and
constant, and both the probability of a sale and the probability of remaining on the
2The time period is defined by a ten-day period.
3Here, the apartment unit type is defined by each apartment unit type in each apartment complex.
For example, different unit types in the same apartment complex and similar unit types in different
apartment complexes are all defined as different apartment unit types.
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list after failing to sell are constant, then the number of listings and the number of
sales in a specific time period are Poisson distributed with some Poisson parameters.
Specifically, these Poisson parameters are the average number of listings and the
average number of sales in each time period. The parameters are constant unless any
one of the probabilities of a new listing, a sale, or remaining on the list changes. In
my panel data, the total number of units in each apartment unit type is sufficiently
large, and the probability of a new listing in the housing market is sufficiently small.
Therefore, the number of listings and the number of sales for a specific apartment
unit type in each time period are Poisson distributed. Moreover, the two Poisson
parameters, the average number of listings and the average number of sales, remain
constant over any period of time that has constant probabilities of a new listing, a
sale, and remaining on the list.
However, I do not directly observe the above probabilities and thus do not observe
the lengths of those time periods with constant Poisson parameters. To determine
each length of time that has the same Poisson parameter, I use cluster analysis, which
is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. More specifically, I apply a divisive
(top-down) hierarchical clustering algorithm to the series of the number of sales for
each apartment unit type. The algorithm is described below.
First of all, consider the likelihood ratio test of two different Poisson parameters.
Let X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} and Y = {y1, y2, · · · , ym} be two different series of random
samples from Poisson(λx) and Poisson(λy), respectively.
H0 : λx = λy vs H1 : λx 6= λy (3.1)
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The log-likelihood ratio test statistic of the above test (3.1) is
logL =(
n∑
i=1
xi +
m∑
j=1
yj)log(
1
n+m
(
n∑
i=1
xi +
m∑
j=1
yj))− (
n∑
i=1
xi)log(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)
− (
m∑
j=1
yj)log(
1
m
m∑
j=1
yj).
(3.2)
The corresponding p-value is
p = 0.5{1− χ21(−2logL)}, (3.3)
where χ21(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the chi-squared distribution
with one degree of freedom.4
For each apartment unit type, the entire series of the number of sales starts as a
single cluster. For each point at which the cluster may be split into two, I calculate
the log-likelihood ratio test statistic as in equation (3.2) and find the point for which
that value is the lowest.5 If the corresponding p-value is less than a pre-set significance
level,6 then I split the cluster into two clusters exactly at that point. I repeat these
steps for each cluster until no further splitting points can be identified.
From this process, I obtain clusters of time periods within which the number of
sales is Poisson distributed with constant Poisson parameters. Note that for each
cluster, the number of listings is also Poisson distributed with a fixed Poisson param-
eter, as we can see in Theorem 17. In other words, for each apartment unit type, I
can find time periods across which the average number of listings is constant.
Table 3.2 gives some descriptive statistics and the results of the cluster analysis.
There are 126,396 apartment unit types in total, and from 2006 to 2017, the average
4Gu et al. (2008)
5Witten et al. (2011) propose using the log-likelihood ratio test statistic as a distance measure
between data points in Poisson clustering, instead of the Euclidean distance.
6I use 1% and 5% in the analysis.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD** Min Max
Transactions data:
Price (in million ₩) 218.54 195.42 1.55 8,200
Age 12.68 7.88 0 56
Area (m2) 74.31 26.40 9.26 424.32
Total number of observations 7,060,291
Built unbalanced panel data:
Number of sales in each time period* 1.54 4.68 1 2351
Number of periods* for each apartment unit type 256.96 158.01 1 432
Total number of apartment unit types 126,396
Total number of observations 4,585,859
Clustering with 1% significance level:
Number of clusters for each apartment unit type 3.24 2.96 1 61
Number of periods* in each cluster 78.79 116.55 1 432
Total number of types × clusters 372,691
Clustering with 5% significance level:
Number of clusters for each apartment unit type 8.38 8.15 1 101
Number of periods* in each cluster 29.18 62.42 1 431
Total number of types × clusters 800,631
*Ten-day period
** Standard deviation
number of ten-day periods between the first sale and the last sale of each apartment
unit type is 256.96.
When clustering, I use 1% and 5% as the significance levels. Note that a lower
significance level splits clusters less finely, and not splitting a cluster that actually
contains two different series of observations with different Poisson parameters induces
bias. In contrast, the choice of a higher significance level splits clusters more finely
and thus reduces potential bias. However, if I split a cluster that actually contained
only one series of observations with a constant Poisson parameter, then the analysis
becomes less powerful. Therefore, I repeated the clustering using two different sig-
nificance levels, 1% and 5%. As we can see in Section 3.5, both analyses give similar
results.
When clustering at the 1% significance level, the number of clusters for each
apartment unit type averages 3.24, and the average number of ten-day periods in
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Figure 3·5: Distribution of the number of clusters for each apartment
unit type (Clustering with 1% significance level)
each cluster is 78.79. This results in a total of 372,691 clusters, that is, groups of
time periods that each have different average numbers of listings.
When clustering at the 5% significance level, the number of clusters for each
apartment unit type averages 8.38, and the average number of ten-day periods in
each cluster is 29.18. This gives a total of 800,631 clusters, that is, groups of time
periods that each have different average numbers of listings.
Figures 3·5 and 3·6 show the distributions of the number of clusters for each
apartment unit type at significance levels of 1% and 5%, respectively. Figures 3·7
and 3·8 show the distributions of the number of ten-day periods in each cluster at
significance levels of 1% and 5%, respectively. Clustering at the 5% significance level
splits clusters more finely and thus produces a greater number of clusters for each
apartment unit type and a smaller number of ten-day periods in each cluster.
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Figure 3·6: Distribution of the number of clusters for each apartment
unit type (Clustering with 5% significance level)
Figure 3·7: Distribution of the number of ten-day periods in each
cluster (Clustering with 1% significance level)
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Figure 3·8: Distribution of the number of ten-day periods in each
cluster (Clustering with 5% significance level)
3.4 Regression model
After clustering time periods, I can use the number of sales in each time period as
a proxy measure for the probability of trade by controlling it with the fixed effect of
the cluster. More specifically, the regression model is
log(yit) = α + β · FIXit + γ′Xit + δiτ + it, t ∈ P iτ , (3.4)
where i ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N}, t ∈ Ti = {1, 2, · · ·Ti}; and Pi = {P i1, P i2, · · · , P iKi} is a
partition of Ti such that every P iτ ∈ Pi is a set of consecutive integers, maxP iτ + 1 =
minP iτ+1 for all τ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Ki− 1}, and Ki ≤ Ti. Note that I find the partition Pi
for each apartment unit type i by using cluster analysis, which is described in Section
3.3.
yit is the number of sales of apartment unit type i in period t. FIXit is the
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proportion of sales for apartment unit type i in period t that fall within the fixed
commission intervals7. For example, if yit = 5 and three out of five sales have prices
that are within the fixed commission intervals, then FIXit =
3
5
. Notably, if FIXit
is close to one, a real estate agent’s incentive is close to that of a trade-maximizing
agent; similarly, if FIXit is close to zero, a real estate agent’s incentive is close to
that of a price-maximizing agent.
Xit is the vector of control variables for apartment unit type i in period t. These
variables are the building’s age8, average price, coefficient of variation of price9, aver-
age price gap10, standard deviation of the price gap, average of the price gap squared,
and floor controls11. I include control variables regarding the price gap for the fol-
lowing reason: In a bargaining process, the buyer wants a lower sales price, while the
seller wants a higher sales price. Thus, if a given sales price is far from the average
market price, whether lower or higher, it is difficult for them to make a deal. Lastly,
δiτ is the fixed effect in cluster τ of apartment unit type i.
3.5 Results of the regression
Table 3.3 shows the results of the regression model from Section 3.4. For all columns,
the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of sales in each ten-day period,
and the independent variable of interest is FIX. Column (i) is an OLS regression,
column (ii) is the OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors at the fixed
7Between 41.6 million and 50 million Korean Won and between 160 million and 200 million
Korean Won.
8The sales year - the year of the building’s construction.
9 Standard Deviation(price)
Mean(price) .
10 {price−Mean(price)}2
Variance(price) , the price gap is calculated within the level of fixed effect groups.
11Floor controls are generated in the same way as FIXit. That is, each control is the proportion
of sales in each floor category. There are a total of 13 floor categories: (1) each floor from 2nd to
9th (8 categories), (2) 10th to 19th floors, (3) 20th to 29th floors, (4) 30th to 39th floors, (5) 40th
to 49th floors, and (6) higher than 50th floor.
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Table 3.3: Regression results
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent variable: log(Number of sales), Variable of interest: FIX
Cluster (1%) FE 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Number of groups – 372,691 126,396 249 65
Cluster (5%) FE 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Number of groups – 800,631 126,396 249 65
Fixed effect: No 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0152***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Number of groups – – 126,396 249 65
Type FE 0.0016*** 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0023)
Number of groups – 126,396 249 65
Type × Year FE 0.0015* 0.0015* 0.0015* 0.0015 0.0015
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Number of groups – 789,713 126,396 249 65
Type × Quarter FE 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Number of groups – 1,899,779 126,396 249 65
Cluster-robust SE I No Yes No No No
Cluster-robust SE II No No Yes No No
Cluster-robust SE III No No No Yes No
Cluster-robust SE IV No No No No Yes
N 4,585,859
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of sales. The independent variable of interest is FIX.
FE and SE stand for fixed effect and standard error, respectively. All columns report the results of OLS regressions.
Cluster-robust standard error I is clustered at the fixed effect group level. For the third panel, it is the robust
standard error. Cluster-robust standard error II is clustered at the level of apartment unit type (126,396 groups).
Cluster-robust standard error III is clustered at the town level (249 groups). Cluster-robust standard error IV is
clustered at the city level (65 groups). Standard errors are in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, and ***p ≤ 0.01.
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effect group level12, column (iii) is the OLS regression with cluster-robust standard
errors at the level of apartment unit type (total 126,396 type groups), column (iv) is
the OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors at the town level (total 249
town groups), and column (v) is the OLS regression with cluster-robust standard
errors at the city level (total 65 city groups).
The first and second panels contain the main results of the cluster fixed effect
regression model, which is described in Section 3.4. The first panel is the result
of clustering at the 1% significance level, while the second panel is the result of
clustering at the 5% significance level. These results indicate that a fixed-commission
real estate agent brings an approximately 0.22 or 0.23%13 greater number of sales in
each ten-day period than does a percentage-commission real estate agent. That is, a
trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher probability of trade than a price-maximizing
agent.
The results in this chapter are consistent with that from the previous chapters.
If a price-maximizing real estate agent truthfully disseminates market information to
buyers and sellers in equilibrium, reducing the intensity of information incompleteness
between buyers and sellers, so does a trade-maximizing real estate agent. However, the
converse of the above statement is not true. Thus, for some cases, a trade-maximizing
agent truthfully disseminates market information, but a price-maximizing agent does
not. As a result, the finer information possessed by a real estate agent is available
to buyers and sellers when the agent receives a fixed commission but is not available
when the agent receives a percentage commission. Therefore, the probability of trade
is higher under a fixed-commission compensation scheme, which makes for smaller
ex-post inefficiency.
I present the other four panels of Table 3.3, which contain the results from different
12For the third panel, it is the OLS regression with robust standard errors.
13e0.0022 ≈ 1.0022, e0.0023 ≈ 1.0023.
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regression models when assuming I cannot perform cluster analysis, for the purpose
of providing a benchmark. The third panel shows results from the regression without
fixed effects. In this model, as I note in Section 3.3, the number of sales is not a good
proxy measure for the probability of trade because, in some cases, we can observe
a large number of sales given a large number of listings despite also having a small
probability of trade. Moreover, it is likely that a higher probability of trade induces
more listings and thus more sales. Therefore, when I do not control the above aspect,
an upward bias results, as the obtained values reflect.
In the absence of cluster analysis, an alternative means of controlling the above
aspect is to assume that the average number of listings for a given apartment unit
type is the same during the same period of time, such as in the same sales year or in
the same sales quarter. That is, I create the partition Pi of Ti in the regression model
of equation (3.4) in Section 3.4 by myself rather than doing so with the clustering
algorithm as described in Section 3.3. The fourth, fifth, and sixth panels give the
results of those regression models.
The fourth panel is the apartment unit type fixed effect regression. In this model,
the partition Pi has only one cell as Pi = {Ti} in the regression model of equation
(3.4). There is a strict assumption that the average number of listings for a specific
apartment unit type is constant regardless of the time period.
The fifth panel is the regression with fixed effects of the interactions between
apartment unit types and years. In this model, there is a less but still strict assump-
tion that the average number of listings for a specific apartment unit type is constant
across a given sales year. In other words, in the regression model of equation (3.4),
each cell of the partition Pi has time periods t that are in the same sales year. Thus,
τ indicates each year from 2006 to 2017.
The sixth panel is similar to the fifth panel; the only difference is the length of
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the time period used. In this model, it is assumed that the average number of listings
for a specific apartment unit type is constant within a given quarter of a given year.
That is, in the regression model of equation (3.4), each cell of the partition Pi has
time periods t that are in a single sales quarter of a given year. Thus, τ indicates
each quarter from 2006 to 2017.
The coefficients of the fourth through sixth panels are not that much different
from those in the first and second panels. However, most of them are insignificant,
especially if I use cluster-robust standard errors. This is because the lengths of time
periods having the same average numbers of listings are very different across apart-
ment unit types. For some apartment unit types, the average number of listings
changes in every short period of time, while for others the number is constant over
several years. We can check this aspect in Figure 3·7 and Figure 3·8. If we simply
assume that the average number of listings is constant within a given sales year or
one sales quarter of a year for all apartment unit types, we may obtain an incorrect
inference.
Another alternative method without using cluster analysis is to assume two dif-
ferent fixed effects, one for the apartment unit type and another for time, which is
widely used in panel data regression analysis. In this case, the regression model is
log(yit) = α + β · FIXit + γ′Xit + δi + ξτ + it, (3.5)
where δi is the apartment unit type fixed effect and ξτ is the time fixed effect. This
regression model is appropriate if the time fixed effect ξτ is constant across all apart-
ment unit types. Thus, if I only use transaction data from one region, which may
have a constant time fixed effect across the observations, then this is an appropri-
ate method. However, I am using transaction data from all over South Korea, and
the time fixed effect can be different by region. Therefore, the regression model of
54
equation (3.5) is less powerful than that of equation (3.4) in Section 3.4.
The results of the regression model of equation (3.5) with various time fixed ef-
fects are given in Appendix C. In these models, cluster-robust standard errors are
larger than those from the regression model of equation (3.4) in Section 3.4, which
uses cluster analysis to determine the fixed effect groups. The full results from the
regression model of equation (3.4) are also included in Appendix C.
3.6 Conclusion
I test the results in the previous chapters using housing transaction data from South
Korea, exploiting the unique feature of the Korean commission scheme for real estate
agents. This feature enables me to compare a price-maximizing agent and a trade-
maximizing agent. The dataset does not include listing activities, so I use cluster
analysis, which is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm, to group the number
of sales observations so that the average number of listings is constant within each
group. After this clustering, I can use the number of sales as a proxy measure for the
probability of trade by controlling it with the group fixed effect.
The results show that a trade-maximizing agent brings an approximately 0.2%
greater number of sales in each ten-day period than a price-maximizing agent. That
is, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher probability of trade, which means
smaller ex-post inefficiency. This is consistent with the result of the theoretical model
of a bargaining game with an informed agent.
As we can see from both the theoretical model and the real-world data, it is
likely that a price-maximizing agent does not disseminate finer information truthfully,
while a trade-maximizing agent does make finer information available in the market.
In such a case, a price-maximizing agent does not reduce the ex-post inefficiency in
markets where a buyer and seller bilaterally bargain to trade a good under incomplete
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information even though the agent could. Therefore, we need to make an informed
agent’s incentive the same as that of a trade-maximizing agent, thereby reducing the
ex-post inefficiency.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) When the buyer’s valuation is vb, the buyer’s problem is
to maximize expected utility by submitting an offer B˜ given the seller’s strategy s(·):
max
B˜
s−1(B˜)∫
vs
{vb − B˜ + s(v
s)
2
} f
s(vs)
F s(vs)− F s(vs)dv
s. (A.1)
The first order condition of the above buyer’s problem is
−1
2
{F s(s−1(B˜))− F s(vs)}+ (vb − B˜)f s(s−1(B˜))ds
−1(B˜)
dB˜
= 0, (A.2)
which is identical to the first order condition of the buyer’s problem in Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1983).
When the seller’s valuation is vs, the seller’s problem is to maximize expected
utility by submitting an offer S˜ given the buyer’s strategy b(·):
max
S˜
vb∫
b−1(S˜)
{b(v
b) + S˜
2
− vs} f
b(vb)
F b(vb)− F b(vb)dv
b. (A.3)
The first order condition of the above seller’s problem is
1
2
{F b(vb)− F b(b−1(S˜))} − (S˜ − vs)f b(b−1(S˜))db
−1(S˜)
dS˜
= 0, (A.4)
which is identical to the first order condition of the seller’s problem in Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983).
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For the rest of the proof, see the proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 in Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1983).
(ii) Straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) As we can see in the proof of Lemma 1, equation (A.2) is
the first order condition of the buyer’s problem that maximizes the buyer’s expected
utility by submitting an offer B˜ given the seller’s strategy s(·) when the buyer’s
valuation is vb. Note that the second order condition of the buyer’s problem is
−3
2
f s(s−1(B˜))
ds−1(B˜)
dB˜
+(vb−B˜)[f s′(s−1(B˜)){ds
−1(B˜)
dB˜
}2+f s(s−1(B˜))d
2s−1(B˜)
dB˜2
] < 0.
(A.5)
Let B be the left-hand side of equation (A.5). Then, from equation (A.2),
dB˜
dvs
= −f
s(vs)
2B
> 0 (A.6)
since f s(vs) > 0 for all vs ∈ [v, v], and B < 0 by equation (A.5). That is, the buyer’s
optimal offer B˜ is increasing in the seller’s lowest value. Therefore, b˜j(v
b) > b˜l(v
b) for
all vb since vsj > v
s
l whenever j > l.
(ii) Similarly, as we can see in the proof of Lemma 1, equation (A.4) is the first
order condition of the seller’s problem that maximizes the seller’s expected utility by
submitting an offer S˜ given the buyer’s strategy b(·) when the seller’s valuation is vs.
Note that the second order condition of the seller’s problem is
−3
2
f b(b−1(S˜))
db−1(S˜)
dS˜
− (S˜ − vs)[f b′(b−1(S˜)){db
−1(S˜)
dS˜
}2 + f b(b−1(S˜))d
2b−1(S˜)
dS˜2
] < 0.
(A.7)
Let S be the left-hand side of equation (A.7). Then, from equation (A.4),
dS˜
dvb
= −f
b(vb)
2S
> 0 (A.8)
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since f b(vb) > 0 for all vb ∈ [v, v], and S < 0 by equation (A.7). That is, the seller’s
optimal offer S˜ is increasing in the buyer’s highest value. Therefore, s˜i(v
s) > s˜k(v
s)
for all vs since vbi+1 > v
b
k+1 whenever i > k.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let b˜l(·) be the solution of b˜(·) in Lemma 1 when the buyer
receives a message msl from the agent and believes that information is truthfully
disseminated to both buyer and seller. Similarly, let s˜k(·) be the solution of s˜ in
Lemma 1 when the seller receives a message mbk from the agent and believes that
information is truthfully disseminated to both buyer and seller.
(i) Note that vbk < v
b
k+1 ≤ vbi < vbi+1. Then, s˜k(vs) < s˜i(vs) for all vs by (ii) in Lemma
2, and b˜j(v
b
k) < b˜j(v
b
i ) and b˜j(v
b
k+1) < b˜j(v
b
i+1) since b˜j(·) is strictly increasing.
(ii) Note that vbi < v
b
i+1 ≤ vbk < vbk+1. Then, s˜k(vs) > s˜i(vs) for all vs by (ii) in Lemma
2, and b˜j(v
b
k) > b˜j(v
b
i ) and b˜j(v
b
k+1) > b˜j(v
b
i+1) since b˜j(·) is strictly increasing.
(iii) Note that vsj < v
s
j+1 ≤ vsl < vsl+1. Then, b˜l(vb) > b˜j(vb) for all vb by (i) in Lemma
2, and s˜i(v
s
l+1) > s˜i(v
s
j+1) and s˜i(v
s
l ) > s˜i(v
s
j ) since s˜i(·) is strictly increasing.
(iv) Note that vsl < v
s
l+1 ≤ vsj < vsj+1. Then, b˜l(vb) < b˜j(vb) for all vb by (i) in Lemma
2, and s˜i(v
s
l+1) < s˜i(v
s
j+1) and s˜i(v
s
l ) < s˜i(v
s
j ) since s˜i(·) is strictly increasing.
Proof of Theorem 1. Proof by contrapositive. Suppose there is a strategy profile
in which an informed agent informs the buyer and seller of the true state, and the
buyer and seller follow the strategies described in Lemma 1. I need to show that if a
trade-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate from the profile, then so does a
price-maximizing agent.1
Note that for a specific state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1]× [vsj , vsj+1] such that vbi < vsj+1 for
1Note that for any given states (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] such that vbi ≥ vsj+1 for some
i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}, the probability of trade in the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed
information is equal to 1 by (ii) in Lemma 1. Therefore, the trade-maximizing agent has no incentive
to deviate. Thus, I need to check the other states where (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] such that
vbi < v
s
j+1 for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1} in which the probability of trade is less than 1.
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some i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}, the probability of trade is∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)
F b(vbi+1)− F b(vbi )
f s(vs)
F s(vsj+1)− F s(vsj )
dvbdvs,
(A.9)
and the expected sales price is∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
b(vb) + s(vs)
2
f b(vb)
F b(vbi+1)− F b(vbi )
· f
s(vs)
F s(vsj+1)− F s(vsj )
dvbdvs,
(A.10)
where b(·) and s(·) are the buyer’s and seller’s offer strategies, respectively. The
informed agent’s possible deviations are delivering a message mbk for some k 6= i to
the seller, delivering a message msl for some l 6= j to the buyer, or both; there are
eight possible deviations in total.
However, the trade-maximizing agent never delivers a message mbk for some i <
k ≤ n to the seller, a message msl for some 0 ≤ l < j to the buyer, or both since the
messages always reduce the probability of trade. That is because, as we can see in
(ii) and (iv) of Lemma 3, the above messages make the seller submit a higher offer,
the buyer submit a lower offer, or both. Moreover, even though a message mbk for
some i < k ≤ n to the seller makes the seller less likely to submit v, and so the
seller’s offer changes from v to less than v, the seller’s submitted offer is still higher
than the highest-value buyer’s offer. Similarly, even though a message msl for some
0 ≤ l < j to the buyer makes the buyer less likely to submit v, and so the buyer’s
offer changes from v to higher than v, the buyer’s submitted offer is still lower than
the lowest-value seller’s offer. Thus, the seller and buyer still have zero probability of
trade. Therefore, the above false messages solely reduce the probability of trade, and
so the trade-maximizing agent never delivers those messages.
Moreover, the trade-maximizing agent never delivers a message mbk for some 0 ≤
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k < i to the seller and a message msl for some j < l ≤ n to the buyer at the same
time. This is because either of the above false messages guarantees that the buyer and
seller trade the good with certainty unless the buyer submits v or the seller submits
v. Thus, adding another false message can only reduce the probability of trade. For
example, if the agent delivers a message mbk for some 0 ≤ k < i to the seller, then
the seller misconceives that the buyer’s valuation is always less than or equal to the
buyer’s true lowest value. Thus, if the seller submits an offer lower than v, the seller
always submits a lower offer than does the buyer who submits an offer higher than
v. Therefore, they trade the good with certainty unless the buyer submits v or the
seller submits v. However, if the agent delivers a message msl for some j < l ≤ n
to the buyer at the same time, then the buyer is more likely to submit v by (iii) in
Lemma 3. Therefore, doing so just reduces the probability of trade, and thus it is not
a profitable deviation for the trade-maximizing agent.
Now, I have four deviations left to check.
i) A false message mbk for some 0 ≤ k < i to the seller:
If there exists a state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}
such that a false message mbk for some 0 ≤ k < i to the seller results in a higher
probability of trade than would the true message mbi , then there exists a state
(vb, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j]× [vsn−i−1, vsn−i] such that a false message msn−k−1 to the buyer
results in a higher probability of trade than would the true message msn−i−1, according
to Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. Note that n−k−1 > n−i−1. Thus, the false mes-
sage msn−k−1 to the buyer makes the buyer who submits an offer higher than v submit
a higher offer than would be submitted in the case of sending the true message msn−i−1
in the state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j] × [vsn−i−1, vsn−i] by (iii) in Lemma 3. Therefore,
the false message msn−k−1 to the buyer results in a higher expected sales price than if
sending the true message msn−i−1 in the state (v
b, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j]× [vsn−i−1, vsn−i].
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ii) A false message msl for some j < l ≤ n to the buyer:
Assume that there exists a state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] for some i, j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n − 1} such that a false message msl for some j < l ≤ n to the buyer
results in a higher probability of trade than would the true message msj . Then, the
false message msl to the buyer also results in a higher expected sales price than if
sending the true message msj in the state (v
b, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1]. That is be-
cause l > j, and thus the false message msl to the buyer makes the buyer who submits
an offer higher than v submit a higher offer than if sending the true message msj by
(iii) in Lemma 3.
iii) A false message mbk for some i < k ≤ n to the seller and a false message msl
for some j < l ≤ n to the buyer:
Assume that there exists a state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] for some i, j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n−1} such that sending a false message mbk for some i < k ≤ n to the seller
and a false message msl for some j < l ≤ n to the buyer at the same time results in a
higher probability of trade than would be the case if sending the true messages mbi to
the seller and msj to the buyer. Then, sending the false message m
b
k to the seller and
the false message msl to the buyer at the same time also results in a higher expected
sales price than in the case of sending the true messages mbi to the seller and m
s
j to
the buyer in the state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1]× [vsj , vsj+1]. The reason is as follows. First,
k > i, and thus the false message mbk to the seller makes the seller who submits an
offer lower than v submit a higher offer than in the case of sending the true message
mbi by (ii) in Lemma 3. Second, l > j, and thus the false message m
s
l to the buyer
makes the buyer who submits an offer higher than v submit a higher offer than in the
case of sending the true message msj by (iii) in Lemma 3.
iv) A false message mbk for some 0 ≤ k < i to the seller and a false message msl
for some 0 ≤ l < j to the buyer:
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If there exists a state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}
such that sending a false message mbk for some 0 ≤ k < i to the seller and a false
message msl for some 0 ≤ l < j to the buyer at the same time results in a higher
probability of trade than would be the case if sending the true messagesmbi to the seller
and msj to the buyer, then there exists a state (v
b, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j]× [vsn−i−1, vsn−i]
such that sending a false message msn−k−1 to the buyer and a false message m
b
n−l−1
to the seller at the same time results in a higher probability of trade than would be
the case if sending the true messages msn−i−1 to the buyer and m
b
n−j−1 to the seller,
according to Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. Note that n− l−1 > n− j−1. Thus,
the false message mbn−l−1 to the seller makes the seller who submits an offer lower
than v submit a higher offer than in the case of sending the true message mbn−j−1
in the state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j] × [vsn−i−1, vsn−i] by (ii) in Lemma 3. Note that
n− k− 1 > n− i− 1. Thus, the false message msn−k−1 to the buyer makes the buyer
who submits an offer higher than v submit a higher offer than in the case of sending
the true message msn−i−1 in the state (v
b, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j] × [vsn−i−1, vsn−i] by (iii)
in Lemma 3. Therefore, sending the false message msn−k−1 to the buyer and the false
message mbn−l−1 to the seller at the same time results in a higher expected sales price
than in the case of sending the true messages msn−i−1 to the buyer and m
b
n−j−1 to the
seller in the state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbn−j−1, vbn−j]× [vsn−i−1, vsn−i].
Proof of Lemma 4. Let bj(·) and si(·) be the buyer’s and seller’s offer strategies
in a state (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1], described in Lemma 1, in the bargaining
equilibrium with fully revealed information. Let b(·) and s(·) be the buyer’s and
seller’s offer strategies, described in Lemma 1, in the babbling equilibrium. Then, I
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need to show that
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
∫ ∫
bj(vb)≥si(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
>
∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[v,v]2
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
(A.11)
for any information partition structure such that v = vb0 < v
b
1 < · · · < vbn = v and
v = vs0 < v
s
1 < · · · < vsn = v.
Let b˜(·) and s˜(·) be the solutions of b˜(·) and s˜(·) in Lemma 1 for the case of the
babbling equilibrium. Then, note that b(vb) = b˜(vb) and s(vs) = s˜(vs) for the buyer
and seller who submit an offer higher than v and lower than v, respectively, by the
boundary conditions in (i) of Lemma 1 since b˜(v) < s˜(v) and b˜(v) < s˜(v).
Let b˜j(·) and s˜i(·) be the solutions of b˜(·) and s˜(·) in Lemma 1 in a state (vb, vs) ∈
[vbi , v
b
i+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] for the case of the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed
information.
i) For any states (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] such that vbi < vsj+1 and i, j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n− 1}, b˜j(vb) ≥ b˜(vb) for all vb ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] by (i) in Lemma 2, and s˜i(vs) ≤
s˜(vs) for all vs ∈ [vsj , vsj+1] by (ii) in Lemma 2, both with strict inequality if i 6= n− 1
or j 6= 0.
Note that in the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information, the buyer
who matches the highest-value seller’s offer trades the good with certainty, and the
seller who matches the lowest-value buyer’s offer also trades the good with certainty.
Moreover, the buyer and seller who submit v and v, respectively, in the bargaining
equilibrium with fully revealed information cannot trade the good in that case nor
in the babbling equilibrium. This is because the buyer’s offer according to the offer
function b˜j(·) is lower than s˜i(vsj ), and s˜i(vsj ) ≤ s˜(vsj ), and because the seller’s offer
according to the offer function s˜i(·) is higher than b˜j(vbi+1), and b˜j(vbi+1) ≥ b˜(vbi+1).
64
Therefore,∫ ∫
bj(vb)≥si(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)
F b(vbi+1)− F b(vbi )
f s(vs)
F s(vsj+1)− F s(vsj )
dvbdvs
>
∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)
F b(vbi+1)− F b(vbi )
f s(vs)
F s(vsj+1)− F s(vsj )
dvbdvs
(A.12)
for any states (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1]×[vsj , vsj+1] such that vbi < vsj+1 and i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n−
1}.
ii) For any states (vb, vs) ∈ [vbi , vbi+1] × [vsj , vsj+1] such that vbi ≥ vsj+1 and i, j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n− 1},∫ ∫
bj(vb)≥si(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)
F b(vbi+1)− F b(vbi )
f s(vs)
F s(vsj+1)− F s(vsj )
dvbdvs = 1
≥
∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)
F b(vbi+1)− F b(vbi )
f s(vs)
F s(vsj+1)− F s(vsj )
dvbdvs
(A.13)
by (ii) in Lemma 1.
By i) and ii), the probability of trade in the bargaining equilibrium with fully
revealed information is higher than in the babbling equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5. Note that the expected sales price in the babbling equilibrium
is ∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[v,v]2
b(vb) + s(vs)
2
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
=
v + v
2
∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[v,v]2
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
(A.14)
by the bargaining rule and Assumption 1. Note that the expected sales price in the
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bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information is
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
∫ ∫
bj(vb)≥si(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
bj(v
b) + si(v
s)
2
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
=
v + v
2
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
∫ ∫
bj(vb)≥si(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
(A.15)
by the bargaining rule, Assumption 1, and Assumption 2. Thus, the expected sales
price in the bargaining equilibrium with fully revealed information is higher than that
in the babbling equilibrium since
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
∫ ∫
bj(vb)≥si(vs), (vb,vs)∈[vbi ,vbi+1]×[vsj ,vsj+1]
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
>
∫ ∫
b(vb)≥s(vs), (vb,vs)∈[v,v]2
f b(vb)f s(vs)dvbdvs
(A.16)
by Lemma 4.
Proof of Corollary 2. Straightforward from Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
Proof of Corollary 3. Straightforward from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that equation (A.2) becomes
−1
2
{s˜−1(B˜)− vs}+ (vb − B˜)ds˜
−1(B˜)
dB˜
= 0, (B.1)
and equation (A.4) becomes
1
2
{vb − b˜−1(S˜)} − (S˜ − vs)db˜
−1(S˜)
dS˜
= 0 (B.2)
with the assumption that vb and vs are independent random variables distributed
uniformly over [0, 1]. b˜(·) in equation (2.1) and s˜(·) in equation (2.2) solve the system
of equations (B.1) and (B.2) such that (B˜, s˜) = (b˜, s˜) = (b˜, S˜) for each vb and vs. The
rest of the proof is straightforward from Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 4 and 5. When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [0, 1]× [1− y, 1], if
the agent tells the true state only to the buyer, then common knowledge is that vb is
uniformly distributed over [0, 1], and vs is uniformly distributed over [1− y, 1]. Thus,
by Lemma 6, the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are
b1(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) if vb ∈ [3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.3)
and
s(vs) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
+ 1
12
(1− y) if vs ∈ [1− y, 3
4
+ 1
4
(1− y)]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
+ 1
4
(1− y), 1] , (B.4)
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respectively. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
3
4
+ 1
4
(1−y)∫
1−y
1∫
vs+ 1
4
y
1
y
dvbdvs =
9y
32
, (B.5)
and the expected sales price is
3
4
+ 1
4
(1−y)∫
1−y
1∫
vs+ 1
4
y
1
2
{2
3
vb+
1
12
+
1
4
(1−y)+2
3
vs+
1
4
+
1
12
(1−y)}1
y
dvbdvs =
9(2− y)y
64
. (B.6)
If the agent delivers a false message ms0 to the buyer and the buyer believes the agent’s
message, then the buyer’s strategy is
b0(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [1
4
, 1]
(B.7)
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
] or
b0(v
b) =

0 if vb ∈ [0, 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [1
4
, (1− y) + 1
4
]
2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
if vb ∈ [(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.8)
for y ∈ [1
4
, 1] by Lemma 6. Note that for y ∈ [0, 1
4
], b0(1) =
2
3
+ 1
12
< s(1 − y) =
2
3
(1 − y) + 1
4
+ 1
12
(1 − y); and for y ∈ [1
4
, 1], b0(1) =
2
3
(1 − y) + 1
4
< s(1 − y) =
2
3
(1 − y) + 1
4
+ 1
12
(1 − y). That is, if the agent lies to the buyer, the buyer and
seller do not trade the good at all because the buyer’s highest offer is always lower
than the seller’s lowest offer. Therefore, neither the trade-maximizing agent nor the
price-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1− y], if the agent tells the true state
only to the buyer, then common knowledge is that vb is uniformly distributed over
[0, 1], and vs is uniformly distributed over [0, 1− y]. Thus, for y ∈ [1
4
, 1], the buyer’s
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and seller’s strategies are
b0(v
b) =

0 if vb ∈ [0, 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [1
4
, (1− y) + 1
4
]
2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
if vb ∈ ((1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.9)
and
s(vs) =
2
3
vs +
1
4
for all vs ∈ [0, 1− y], (B.10)
respectively, by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
1−y∫
0
1∫
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs +
1−y∫
0
(1−y)+ 1
4∫
vs+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
1
4
+
1
2
y, (B.11)
and the expected sales price is
1−y∫
0
1∫
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
+ 2
3
vs + 1
4
} 1
1−ydv
bdvs (B.12)
+
1−y∫
0
(1−y)+ 1
4∫
vs+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 2
3
vs + 1
4
} 1
1−ydv
bdvs = 5+20y−16y
2
48
.
If the agent delivers a false message ms1 to the buyer and the buyer believes the agent’s
message, then the buyer’s strategy is
b1(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) if vb ∈ [3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.13)
by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade is
1−y∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
3
4
y, (B.14)
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and the expected sales price is
1−y∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb +
1
12
+
1
4
(1− y) + 2
3
vs +
1
4
} 1
1− ydv
bdvs =
(19− 10y)y
32
. (B.15)
Note that 1
4
+ 1
2
y ≥ 3
4
y for all y ∈ [1
4
, 1]. That is, the trade-maximizing agent has no
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Note that 5+20y−16y
2
48
≥ (19−10y)y
32
if and only if y ∈ [1
4
, 3
√
41−17
4
], and 5+20y−16y
2
48
<
(19−10y)y
32
if and only if y ∈ (3
√
41−17
4
, 1]. That is, the price-maximizing agent has no
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium if and only if y ∈ [1
4
, 3
√
41−17
4
].
For y ∈ [0, 1
4
], the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are
b0(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [1
4
, 1]
(B.16)
and
s(vs) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
, 1− y] , (B.17)
respectively, by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
3
4∫
0
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
9
32(1− y) , (B.18)
and the expected sales price is
3
4∫
0
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
2
(
2
3
vb +
1
12
+
2
3
vs +
1
4
)
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
9
64(1− y) . (B.19)
If the agent delivers a false message ms1 to the buyer and the buyer believes the agent’s
message, then the buyer’s strategy is
b1(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) if vb ∈ [3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.20)
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by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade is
3
4∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
9y
16(1− y) , (B.21)
and the expected sales price is
3
4∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb +
1
12
+
1
4
(1− y) + 2
3
vs +
1
4
} 1
1− ydv
bdvs =
9(3− y)y
64(1− y) . (B.22)
Note that 9
32(1−y) >
9y
16(1−y) and
9
64(1−y) >
9(3−y)y
64(1−y) for all y ∈ [0, 14 ]. That is, neither the
trade-maximizing agent nor the price-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7 and 8. When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1 − y], in
a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises a buyer only,
the probability of trade is 9
32(1−y) by equation (B.18), and the expected sales price
is 9
64(1−y) by equation (B.19), for y ∈ [0, 14 ]. For y ∈ [14 , 1], the probability of trade
is 1
4
+ 1
2
y by equation (B.11), and the expected sales price is 5+20y−16y
2
48
by equation
(B.12).
When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [0, 1]× [1− y, 1], in a bargaining equilibrium in
which an informed agent truthfully advises a buyer only, the probability of trade is
9y
32
by equation (B.5), and the expected sales price is 9(2−y)y
64
by equation (B.6).
Thus, for y ∈ [0, 1
4
], the probability of trade is
(1− y) 9
32(1− y) + y
9y
32
=
9(1 + y2)
32
, (B.23)
and the expected sales price is
(1− y) 9
64(1− y) + y
9(2− y)y
64
=
9(1 + 2y2 − y3)
64
. (B.24)
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Note that in Chatterjee and Samuelson’s (1983) babbling equilibrium, the probability
of trade is 9
32
and the expected sales price is 9
64
. 9(1+y
2)
32
≥ 9
32
and 9(1+2y
2−y3)
64
≥ 9
64
for
all y ∈ [0, 1
4
].
For y ∈ [1
4
, 1], the probability of trade is
(1− y)(1
4
+
1
2
y) + y
9y
32
=
8 + 8y − 7y2
32
, (B.25)
and the expected sales price is
(1− y)5 + 20y − 16y
2
48
+ y
9(2− y)y
64
=
20 + 60y − 90y2 + 37y3
192
. (B.26)
8+8y−7y2
32
≥ 9
32
and 20+60y−90y
2+37y3
192
≥ 9
64
for all y ∈ [1
4
, 1].
Proof of Corollary 6. Straightforward from Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and Lemma
7.
Proof of Corollary 7. Straightforward from Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and Lemma
8.
Proof of Theorem 8 and 9. When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [0, y] × [0, 1], if
the agent tells the true state only to the seller, then common knowledge is that vb is
uniformly distributed over [0, y], and vs is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Thus, by
Lemma 6, the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are
b(vb) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 1
4
y)
2
3
vb + 1
12
y if vb ∈ [1
4
y, y]
(B.27)
and
s0(v
s) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
y if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
y]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
y, 1]
, (B.28)
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respectively. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
3
4
y∫
0
y∫
vs+ 1
4
y
1
y
dvbdvs =
9y
32
, (B.29)
and the expected sales price is
3
4
y∫
0
y∫
vs+ 1
4
y
1
2
(
2
3
vb +
1
12
y +
2
3
vs +
1
4
y)
1
y
dvbdvs =
9y2
64
. (B.30)
If the agent delivers a false message mb1 to the seller and the seller believes the agent’s
message, then the seller’s strategy is
s1(v
s) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
, 1]
(B.31)
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
] or
s1(v
s) =

2
3
y + 1
12
if vs ∈ [0, y − 1
4
]
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [y − 1
4
, 3
4
]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
, 1]
(B.32)
for y ∈ [1
4
, 1] by Lemma 6. Note that for y ∈ [0, 1
4
], s1(0) =
1
4
> b(y) = 2
3
y + 1
12
y;
and for y ∈ [1
4
, 1], s1(0) =
2
3
y + 1
12
> b(y) = 2
3
y + 1
12
y. That is, if the agent lies
to the seller, the buyer and seller do not trade the good at all because the buyer’s
highest offer is always lower than the seller’s lowest offer. Therefore, neither the
trade-maximizing agent nor the price-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium.
When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [y, 1]× [0, 1], if the agent tells the true state only
to the seller, then common knowledge is that vb is uniformly distributed over [y, 1],
and vs is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Thus, for y ∈ [1
4
, 1], the buyer’s and seller’s
strategies are
b(vb) =
2
3
vb +
1
12
for all vb ∈ [y, 1] (B.33)
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and
s1(v
s) =

2
3
y + 1
12
if vs ∈ [0, y − 1
4
)
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [y − 1
4
, 3
4
]
1 if vb ∈ (3
4
, 1]
, (B.34)
respectively, by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
y− 1
4∫
0
1∫
y
1
1− ydv
bdvs +
3
4∫
y− 1
4
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
1
4
+
1
2
y, (B.35)
and the expected sales price is
y− 1
4∫
0
1∫
y
1
2
(2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 2
3
y + 1
12
) 1
1−ydv
bdvs (B.36)
+
3
4∫
y− 1
4
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
2
(2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 2
3
vs + 1
4
) 1
1−ydv
bdvs = 16y
2+4y+7
48
.
If the agent delivers a false message mb0 to the seller and the seller believes the agent’s
message, then the seller’s strategy is
s0(v
s) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
y if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
y]
1 if vb ∈ (3
4
y, 1]
(B.37)
by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade is
3
4
y∫
0
1∫
y
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
3
4
y, (B.38)
and the expected sales price is
3
4
y∫
0
1∫
y
1
2
(
2
3
vb +
1
12
+
2
3
vs +
1
4
y)
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
5y(1 + 2y)
32
. (B.39)
Note that 1
4
+ 1
2
y ≥ 3
4
y and 16y
2+4y+7
48
> 5y(1+2y)
32
for all y ∈ [1
4
, 1]. That is, neither the
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trade-maximizing agent nor the price-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium.
For y ∈ [0, 1
4
], the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are
b(vb) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [0, 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [1
4
, 1]
(B.40)
and
s1(v
s) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
, 1]
, (B.41)
respectively, by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
3
4∫
0
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
9
32(1− y) , (B.42)
and the expected sales price is
3
4∫
0
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
2
(
2
3
vb +
1
12
+
2
3
vs +
1
4
)
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
9
64(1− y) . (B.43)
If the agent delivers a false message mb0 to the seller and the seller believes the agent’s
message, then the seller’s strategy is
s0(v
s) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
y if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
y]
1 if vb ∈ (3
4
y, 1]
(B.44)
by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade is
3
4
y∫
0
1∫
y
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
3y
4
, (B.45)
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and the expected sales price is
3
4
y∫
0
1∫
y
1
2
(
2
3
vb +
1
12
+
2
3
vs +
1
4
y)
1
1− ydv
bdvs =
5y(1 + 2y)
32
. (B.46)
Note that 9
32(1−y) >
3y
4
and 9
64(1−y) >
5y(1+2y)
32
for all y ∈ [0, 1
4
]. That is, neither the
trade-maximizing agent nor the price-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 10 and 11. When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈ [y, 1]× [0, 1−y], if
the agent tells the true state to the buyer and seller, then common knowledge is that
vb is uniformly distributed over [y, 1], and vs is uniformly distributed over [0, 1− y].
For y ∈ [1
2
, 1], the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are b0(v
b) = s1(v
s) = 1
2
for
all vb ∈ [y, 1] and vs ∈ [0, 1 − y]. Thus, the buyer and seller trade the good with
certainty, and the expected sales price is 1
2
. Note that the trade-maximizing agent
has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium since the probability of trade equals
to 1.
Note that the agent’s possible deviations are delivering a false message mb0 to the
seller or a false message ms1 to the buyer or both. Because of the reflection-symmetric
nature of the setting, the false message mb0 to the seller and the false message m
s
1 to
the buyer has the same effect on the change in the probability of trade. Moreover,
if the agent delivers the false message mb0 to the seller and the false message m
s
1 to
the buyer at the same time, as we saw in the proof of Theorem 1, it has a lower
probability of trade than a one-sided false message of mb0 to the seller or m
s
1 to the
buyer.
Also, note that the false message mb0 to the seller makes the seller submit a lower
offer when the seller submits lower than 1 by (i) in Lemma 3, and the false message
ms1 to the buyer makes the buyer submit a higher offer when the buyer submits higher
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than 0 by (iii) in Lemma 3. Therefore, delivering the false message ms1 to the buyer
is the most profitable deviation of the price-maximizing agent among the possible
deviations. Thus, I only need to check the false message ms1 to the buyer.
If the agent delivers the false message ms1 to the buyer and the buyer believes the
agent’s message, then the buyer’s strategy is
b1(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [y, 3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) if vb ∈ [3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.47)
for y ∈ [1
2
, 4
7
] or for y ∈ [4
7
, 1],
b1(v
b) =
2
3
vb +
1
12
+
1
4
(1− y) for all vb ∈ [y, 1] (B.48)
by Lemma 6. Thus, the expected sales price is
1−y∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb +
1
12
+
1
4
(1− y) + 1
2
} 1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
3y(3− y)
16(1− y) (B.49)
for y ∈ [1
2
, 4
7
] or
1−y∫
0
1∫
y
1
2
{2
3
vb +
1
12
+
1
4
(1− y) + 1
2
} 1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
14 + y
24
(B.50)
for y ∈ [4
7
, 1]. Note that 14+y
24
> 1
2
for all y ∈ [4
7
, 1], 3y(3−y)
16(1−y) ≤ 12 if and only if
y ∈ [1
2
, 17−
√
193
6
], and 3y(3−y)
16(1−y) >
1
2
if and only if y ∈ (17−
√
193
6
, 4
7
]. That is, the price-
maximizing agent has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium if and only if
y ∈ [1
2
, 17−
√
193
6
].
Similarly, for y ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
], the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are
b0(v
b) =
{
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [y, (1− y) + 1
4
]
2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
if vb ∈ [(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.51)
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and
s1(v
s) =
{
2
3
y + 1
12
if vs ∈ [0, y − 1
4
]
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [y − 1
4
, 1− y] , (B.52)
respectively, by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade in equilibrium is
∫ y− 1
4
0
∫ (1−y)+ 1
4
y
1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs +
∫ 1
y− 1
4
∫ (1−y)+ 1
4
y
1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs (B.53)
+
∫ 1−y
y− 1
4
∫ (1−y)+ 1
4
vs+ 1
4
1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs +
∫ 1−y
y− 1
4
∫ 1
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs = 7+16y−32y
2
32(1−y)2 ,
and the expected sales price is
∫ y− 1
4
0
∫ (1−y)+ 1
4
y
1
2
{2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 2
3
y + 1
12
} 1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs (B.54)
+
∫ 1
y− 1
4
∫ (1−y)+ 1
4
y
1
2
{2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
+ 2
3
y + 1
12
} 1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs
+
∫ 1−y
y− 1
4
∫ (1−y)+ 1
4
vs+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 2
3
vs + 1
4
} 1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs
+
∫ 1−y
y− 1
4
∫ 1
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
+ 2
3
vs + 1
4
} 1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs = 7+16y−32y
2
64(1−y)2 .
If the agent delivers a false message ms1 to the buyer and the buyer believes the agent’s
message, then the buyer’s strategy is
b1(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [y, 3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) if vb ∈ [3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.55)
by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade is
1−y∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
3y
4(1− y) , (B.56)
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and the expected sales price is
y− 1
4∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) + 2
3
y + 1
12
} 1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs (B.57)
+
1−y∫
y− 1
4
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) + 2
3
vs + 1
4
} 1
(1−y)2dv
bdvs = y(77−124y+56y
2)
128(1−y)2 .
Note that 7+16y−32y
2
32(1−y)2 >
3y
4(1−y) for all y ∈ [14 , 12 ]. That is, the trade-maximizing agent
has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Note that 7+16y−32y
2
64(1−y)2 ≥ y(77−124y+56y
2)
128(1−y)2 if and only if y ∈ [14 , 128{10 − 5×22
2/3
(27+7
√
71)1/3
+
(22(27 + 7
√
71))1/3}], and 7+16y−32y2
64(1−y)2 <
y(77−124y+56y2)
128(1−y)2 if and only if y ∈ ( 128{10 −
5×222/3
(27+7
√
71)1/3
+ (22(27 + 7
√
71))1/3}, 1
2
]. That is, the price-maximizing agent has no
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium if and only if y ∈ [1
4
, 1
28
{10− 5×222/3
(27+7
√
71)1/3
+
(22(27 + 7
√
71))1/3}].
For y ∈ [0, 1
4
], the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are
b0(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [y, 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
if vb ∈ [1
4
, 1]
(B.58)
and
s1(v
s) =
{
2
3
vs + 1
4
if vs ∈ [0, 3
4
]
1 if vs ∈ (3
4
, 1− y] , (B.59)
respectively, by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade in the equilibrium is
3
4∫
0
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
9
32(1− y)2 , (B.60)
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and the expected sales price is
3
4∫
0
1∫
vs+ 1
4
1
2
(
2
3
vb +
1
12
+
2
3
vs +
1
4
)
1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
9
64(1− y)2 . (B.61)
If the agent delivers a false message ms1 to the buyer and the buyer believes the agent’s
message, then the buyer’s strategy is
b1(v
b) =
{
0 if vb ∈ [y, 3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
)
2
3
vb + 1
12
+ 1
4
(1− y) if vb ∈ [3
4
(1− y) + 1
4
, 1]
(B.62)
by Lemma 6. Then, the probability of trade is
3
4∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
9y
16(1− y)2 , (B.63)
and the expected sales price is
3
4∫
0
1∫
3
4
(1−y)+ 1
4
1
2
{2
3
vb +
1
12
+
1
4
(1− y) + 2
3
vs +
1
4
} 1
(1− y)2dv
bdvs =
9(3− y)y
64(1− y)2 . (B.64)
Note that 9
32(1−y)2 >
9y
16(1−y)2 and
9
64(1−y)2 >
9(3−y)y
64(1−y)2 for all y ∈ [0, 14 ]. That is,
neither the trade-maximizing agent nor the price-maximizing agent has an incentive
to deviate from the equilibrium.
Similarly, it is easy to check the following. When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈
[0, y] × [0, 1 − y], the trade-maximizing agent has no incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium, and the price-maximizing agent has no incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium if and only if y ∈ [0, 25+3
√
41
64
≈ 0.6908]. When the true state is (vb, vs) ∈
[y, 1]× [1− y, 1] or (vb, vs) ∈ [0, y]× [1− y, 1], neither the trade-maximizing agent nor
the price-maximizing agent has an incentive to deviate.
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Proof of Corollary 12. Straightforward from Theorem 10 and Theorem 11.
Proof of Corollary 13. Straightforward from Theorem 4, Theorem 8, and Theorem
10.
Proof of Corollary 14. Straightforward from Theorem 5, Theorem 9, and Theorem
11.
Proof of Lemma 9. It is straightforward to calculate the probability of trade in
each equilibrium. The probability of trade in the babbling equilibrium is 9
32
. In both
bargaining equilibria in which an informed agent truthfully advises a buyer only and
an informed agent truthfully advises a seller only, the probability of trade is 9(1+y
2)
32
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
] and 8+8y−7y
2
32
for y ∈ [1
4
, 1]. The probability of trade in a bargaining
equilibrium in which an informed agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller is
9(1+2y2)
32
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
], 7+16y−14y
2
32
for y ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
], 41−100y+86y
2
32
for y ∈ [1
2
, 4
7
], and 3(3+4y−4y
2)
32
for y ∈ [4
7
, 1].
9(1+y2)
32
≥ 9
32
for all y ∈ [0, 1
4
], and 8+8y−7y
2
32
≥ 9
32
for all y ∈ [1
4
, 1].
9(1+2y2)
32
≥ 9(1+y2)
32
for all y ∈ [0, 1
4
], 7+16y−14y
2
32
> 8+8y−7y
2
32
for all y ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
],
41−100y+86y2
32
> 8+8y−7y
2
32
for all y ∈ [1
2
, 4
7
], and 3(3+4y−4y
2)
32
≥ 8+8y−7y2
32
for all y ∈ [4
7
, 1].
Proof of Lemma 10. It is straightforward to calculate the expected sales price
in each equilibrium. The expected sales price in the babbling equilibrium is 9
64
.
The expected sales price in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed agent
truthfully advises a buyer only is 9(1+2y
2−3y3)
64
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
] and 20+60y−90y
2+37y3
192
for
y ∈ [1
4
, 1]. The expected sales price in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed
agent truthfully advises a seller only is 9(1+y
3)
64
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
] and 28−12y+48y
2−37y3
192
for
y ∈ [1
4
, 1]. The expected sales price in a bargaining equilibrium in which an informed
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agent truthfully advises both buyer and seller is 9(1+2y
2)
64
for y ∈ [0, 1
4
], 7+16y−14y
2
64
for
y ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
], 41−100y+86y
2
64
for y ∈ [1
2
, 4
7
], and 3(3+4y−4y
2)
64
for y ∈ [4
7
, 1].
9(1+2y2−3y3)
64
≥ 9(1+y3)
64
≥ 9
64
for all y ∈ [0, 1
4
], 20+60y−90y
2+37y3
192
≥ 28−12y+48y2−37y3
192
≥
9
64
for all y ∈ [1
4
, 2(8+3
√
3)
37
], and 28−12y+48y
2−37y3
192
≥ 20+60y−90y2+37y3
192
≥ 9
64
for all y ∈
[2(8+3
√
3)
37
, 1].
9(1+2y2)
64
≥ 9(1+2y2−3y3)
64
for all y ∈ [0, 1
4
], 7+16y−14y
2
64
> 20+60y−90y
2+37y3
192
for all y ∈
[1
4
, 1
2
], 41−100y+86y
2
64
> 20+60y−90y
2+37y3
192
for all y ∈ [1
2
, 4
7
], 3(3+4y−4y
2)
64
> 20+60y−90y
2+37y3
192
for all y ∈ [4
7
, 2(8+3
√
3)
37
], and 3(3+4y−4y
2)
64
≥ 28−12y+48y2−37y3
192
for all y ∈ [2(8+3
√
3)
37
, 1].
Proof of Corollary 15. Straightforward from Corollary 13, Corollary 14, and
Lemma 9.
Proof of Corollary 16. Straightforward from Corollary 13, Corollary 14, and
Lemma 10.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
Proof of Theorem 17. Let Yi be the random variable of the number of new listings
in period i, Xi be the random variable of the number of listings that are unsold in
period i and remain on the list for period i+1, Zi be the random variable of the total
number of listings in period i, and Wi be the random variable of the number of sales
in period i.
Then,
Z0 = Y0 ∼ Binomial(n, p),W0 ∼ Binomial(n, pq),
and
X0 ∼ Binomial(n, p(1− q)r).
Conditional on X0 = x0,
Y1 ∼ Binomial(n− x0, p).
That is, unconditionally,
Y1 ∼ Binomial(n, p{1− p(1− q)r}).
Thus,
Z1 = Y1 +X0 ∼ Binomial(n, p{1 + (1− p)(1− q)r}),
W1 ∼ Binomial(n, p{1 + (1− p)(1− q)r}q),
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and
X1 ∼ Binomial(n, p{1 + (1− p)(1− q)r}(1− q)r).
Conditional on X1 = x1,
Y2 ∼ Binomial(n− x1, p).
That is, unconditionally,
Y2 ∼ Binomial(n, p[1− p{1 + (1− p)(1− q)r}(1− q)r]).
Thus,
Z2 = Y2 +X1 ∼ Binomial(n, p{1 + (1− p)(1− q)r + (1− p)2(1− q)2r2}),
and
W2 ∼ Binomial(n, p{1 + (1− p)(1− q)r + (1− p)2(1− q)2r2}q).
Similarly,
Zk ∼ Binomial(n, p{
k∑
i=0
(1− p)i(1− q)iri}),
and
Wk ∼ Binomial(n, p{
k∑
i=0
(1− p)i(1− q)iri}q).
As k →∞,
Z ∼ Binomial(n, p
1− (1− p)(1− q)r ), and W ∼ Binomial(n,
pq
1− (1− p)(1− q)r ).
By the Poisson Limit Theorem,
Z ∼ Poisson( np
1− (1− p)(1− q)r ), and W ∼ Poisson(
npq
1− (1− p)(1− q)r ).
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Results of the regression models with two-way fixed effects of
apartment unit type and time
Table C.1: Results of the regression models with two-way fixed effects
of apartment unit type and time
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent variable: log(Number of sales), Variable of interest: FIX
Type & year FEs 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024** 0.0024 0.0024
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0019)
Number of groups – 789,713 126,396 249 65
Type & year & quarter FEs 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028* 0.0028
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Number of groups – 1,899,779 126,396 249 65
Type & year × quarter FEs 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028* 0.0028
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0019)
Number of groups – 1,899,779 126,396 249 65
Type & year & month FEs 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037**
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0017)
Number of groups – 3,232,668 126,396 249 65
Type & year × month FEs 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037**
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0017)
Number of groups – 3,232,668 126,396 249 65
Cluster-robust SE I No Yes No No No
Cluster-robust SE II No No Yes No No
Cluster-robust SE III No No No Yes No
Cluster-robust SE IV No No No No Yes
N 4,585,859
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of sales. The independent variable of interest is FIX.
FEs and SE stand for fixed effects and standard error, respectively. All columns report the results of OLS
regressions. Cluster-robust standard error I is clustered at the level of the interacted group between two-way fixed
effects of apartment unit type and time in each panel. Cluster-robust standard error II is clustered at the level of
apartment unit type (126,396 groups). Cluster-robust standard error III is clustered at the town level (249 groups).
Cluster-robust standard error IV is clustered at the city level (65 groups). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, and ***p ≤ 0.01.
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Full results from the regression model with 1% clustering
Table C.2: Full results from the regression model with 1% clustering
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent variable: log(Number of sales), Variable of interest: FIX
FIX 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Age 0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002 0.0002
(7.79e-05) (6.84e-05) (6.88e-05) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Avg price 1.79e-06*** 1.79e-06*** 1.79e-06*** 1.79e-06*** 1.79e-06***
(4.46e-08) (6.40e-08) (6.56e-08) (2.09e-07) (2.97e-07)
CV price 6.0751*** 6.0751*** 6.0751*** 6.0751*** 6.0751***
(0.0060) (0.0317) (0.0351) (0.0957) (0.1694)
Avg price gap -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258***
(0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
SD price gap 0.0282*** 0.0282*** 0.0282*** 0.0282*** 0.0282***
(0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Avg (price gap)2 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(7.73e-06) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
2nd floor 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0172***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0017)
3rd floor 0.0243*** 0.0243*** 0.0243*** 0.0243*** 0.0243***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0020)
4th floor 0.0260*** 0.0260*** 0.0260*** 0.0260*** 0.0260***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0023)
5th floor 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0023)
6th floor 0.0280*** 0.0280*** 0.0280*** 0.0280*** 0.0280***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0026)
7th floor 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0025)
8th floor 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0023)
9th floor 0.0265*** 0.0265*** 0.0265*** 0.0265*** 0.0265***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0022)
10th-19th floors 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 0.0253***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0023)
20th-29th floors 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0239***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0024)
30th-39th floors 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206***
(0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0031)
40th-49th floors 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057
(0.0075) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Higher than 50th floor -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0113
(0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Cluster-robust SE I No Yes No No No
Cluster-robust SE II No No Yes No No
Cluster-robust SE III No No No Yes No
Cluster-robust SE IV No No No No Yes
N 4,585,859
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of sales. The independent variable of interest is FIX.
Avg, CV, SD, and SE stand for average, the coefficient of variation, standard deviation, and standard error,
respectively. All columns report the results of OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard error I is clustered at the
fixed effect group level (372,691 groups). Cluster-robust standard error II is clustered at the level of apartment unit
type (126,396 groups). Cluster-robust standard error III is clustered at the town level (249 groups). Cluster-robust
standard error IV is clustered at the city level (65 groups). Standard errors are in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05,
and ***p ≤ 0.01.
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Full results from the regression model with 5% clustering
Table C.3: Full results from the regression model with 5% clustering
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent variable: log(Number of sales), Variable of interest: FIX
FIX 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Age 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004* 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Avg price 1.94e-06*** 1.94e-06*** 1.94e-06*** 1.94e-06*** 1.94e-06***
(5.63e-08) (7.32e-08) (7.74e-08) (2.70e-07) (3.72e-07)
CV price 5.6086*** 5.6086*** 5.6086*** 5.6086*** 5.6086***
(0.0063) (0.0297) (0.0345) (0.0851) (0.1336)
Avg price gap -0.0361*** -0.0361*** -0.0361*** -0.0361*** -0.0361***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008)
SD price gap 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0454***
(0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0032)
Avg (price gap)2 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(1.41e-05) (4.18e-05) (4.19e-05) (4.71e-05) (5.07e-05)
2nd floor 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0012)
3rd floor 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0157***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0013)
4th floor 0.0159*** 0.0159*** 0.0159*** 0.0159*** 0.0159***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0015)
5th floor 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 0.0157***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0015)
6th floor 0.0175*** 0.0175*** 0.0175*** 0.0175*** 0.0175***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0017)
7th floor 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0017)
8th floor 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0164***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0015)
9th floor 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014)
10th-19th floors 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0153***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0015)
20th-29th floors 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0143***
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0017)
30th-39th floors 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0105***
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0027)
40th-49th floors -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0075) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Higher than 50th floor -0.0192 -0.0192 -0.0192 -0.0192 -0.0192
(0.0145) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0114)
Cluster-robust SE I No Yes No No No
Cluster-robust SE II No No Yes No No
Cluster-robust SE III No No No Yes No
Cluster-robust SE IV No No No No Yes
N 4,585,859
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of sales. The independent variable of interest is FIX.
Avg, CV, SD, and SE stand for average, the coefficient of variation, standard deviation, and standard error,
respectively. All columns report the results of OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard error I is clustered at the
fixed effect group level (800,631 groups). Cluster-robust standard error II is clustered at the level of apartment unit
type (126,396 groups). Cluster-robust standard error III is clustered at the town level (249 groups). Cluster-robust
standard error IV is clustered at the city level (65 groups). Standard errors are in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05,
and ***p ≤ 0.01.
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